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I. INTRODUCTION 
The consensus paper that anchors this Symposium breaks 
new ground contemplating the practicalities of returning 
incidental findings (IFs) and other individual research results 
(IRRs) to the contributors of specimens or DNA data stored in 
biobanks and used for genetic and genomic research.1 Actors 
within the biobank system who conscientiously seek to address 
these issues will confront dizzying regulatory complexities at 
every turn. While acknowledged in the consensus paper, these 
complexities were too broad for detailed consideration in that 
paper. This Article fills in the compliance challenges connected 
to one key step in the return of IFs and IRRs: the 
reidentification of specimens or data. 
The large majority of genetic and genomic research in the 
United States is subject to either the Department of Health and 
Human Services (DHHS) Common Rule2 that governs human 
                                                          
 1. Susan M. Wolf et al., Managing Research Results and Incidental 
Findings in Genomic Research Involving Biobanks & Archived Datasets, 14 
GENETICS MED. 361 (2012). 
 2. Multiple federal agencies have adopted the Common Rule. Each 
agency separately codifies the rule in the Code of Federal Regulations. The 
agency most relevant to this discussion is the Department of Health and 
Human Services, which has codified the Common Rule at Subpart A of 45 
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subjects research, the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act (HIPAA) Privacy Rule,3 or both. Both of 
these regimes create huge incentives for biobanks to provide 
and for researchers to use specimens or data that have been 
deidentified according to specific definitions spelled out in the 
regulations or in guidance materials supplementing the 
regulations. The reasons for promoting deidentification are 
sound. By encouraging the stripping of identifying information 
from specimens or data used by researchers, these regulations 
and guidance materials aim to reduce threats to the personal 
privacy of contributors. But these rules do not accommodate 
emerging views, exemplified by the consensus paper, about the 
desirability of returning IFs and IRRs to contributors in at 
least some circumstances.4 Indeed, a recent Advanced Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking to amend the Common Rule,5 while 
simplifying some aspects of the regulations, would further 
entrench deidentification as a fundamental attribute of most 
genetic and genomic research using specimens and data stored 
in biobanks. This reliance on deidentification creates obstacles 
for any attempt to return IFs or IRRs. 
Following this Introduction, this Article proceeds in Part II 
to summarize the tangle of regulatory requirements implicated 
by the reidentification of specimens or data in order to return 
IFs and IRRs. Part III examines the recently issued Advance 
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking that contemplates changing the 
Common Rule in ways that would further complicate return of 
IFs and IRRs within biobank research systems. Part IV then 
describes the regulatory challenges that specimen or data 
collection sites, biobanks, and researchers face as a result of 
these current and proposed rules. Finally, Part V offers some 
models for biobank systems to address those challenges. 
  
                                                          
C.F.R § 46. 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.101–46.124 (2011). For more discussion of the 
Common Rule, see infra Part II.A. 
 3. 45 C.F.R. §§ 160.101–160.552, 162.100–162.1802, 164.102–164.534 
(2011). For more discussion of HIPAA and the HIPAA Privacy Rule, see infra 
Part II.B. 
 4. Wolf et al., supra note 1, at 369. 
 5. Human Subjects Research Protections: Enhancing Protections for 
Research Subjects and Reducing Burden, Delay, and Ambiguity for 
Investigators, 76 Fed. Reg. 44,512, 44,513–14 (July 26, 2011) (to be codified at 
45 C.F.R. pts 46, 160, 164, and 21 C.F.R. pts 50, 56). For more discussion of 
these proposed amendments, see infra Part III. 
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II. CURRENT REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS FOR 
BIOBANK RESEARCH UNDER THE COMMON RULE    
AND HIPAA 
A biobank research system encompasses three roles: (1) 
initial collection sites feeding specimens or data into the 
system, (2) biobanks aggregating those specimens or data for 
downstream research use, and (3) secondary researchers 
obtaining and using specimens or data from biobanks.6 In the 
simplest model, a collection site serves merely as the conduit 
between individuals who contribute specimens or related data 
and a biobank that, in turn, provides those specimens or data 
to secondary researchers who actually conduct the research and 
analysis. In reality, however, the design is often far more 
complex and differs significantly from one biobank system to 
the next. Research activities may take place anywhere within 
the system. Potential collection sites include both primary 
researchers conducting individual research studies and clinical 
sources such as hospitals that may or may not conduct 
research. Furthermore, biobanks may collect their own 
specimens or data, partly or entirely eliminating the distinct 
role of the collection site in that biobank system. Some 
biobanks, such as the Framingham Heart Study7 and Coriell 
Personalized Medicine Collaborative,8 conduct their own 
research in addition to aggregating and distributing specimens 
and data, while others, such as the Rhode Island BioBank,9 
serve only the latter function. Thus, a biobank may be a 
primary researcher if it is a collection site and it conducts 
research; a secondary researcher if it conducts research on pre-
existing specimens or data obtained from primary collection 
sites; or not a researcher at all if it only aggregates and 
distributes pre-existing specimens and data. 
Depending on the type of researching entity, the particular 
                                                          
 6. Wolf et al., supra note 1, at 362, fig. 1. 
 7. About the Framingham Heart Study, FRAMINGHAM HEART STUDY, 
http://www.framinghamheartstudy.org/about/index.html (last updated Apr. 5, 
2012). 
 8. About the Study, CORIELL PERSONALIZED MED. COLLABORATIVE, 
http://cpmc.coriell.org/Sections/About/?SId=9 (last visited Apr. 16, 2012). 
 9. Brown Univ., Core Facilities, Research Facilities and Teaching 
Facilities, CENTER FOR BIOMEDICAL ENGINEERING, http://www.brown.edu/ 
Departments/Center_for_Biomedical_Engineering/about/facilities_and_centers
/facility_descriptions (last visited Apr. 16, 2012). 
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activities it conducts, and the level of identifiability of 
specimens or data used, research on specimens or data may be 
subject to multiple overlapping regulatory regimes. The most 
prominent of these are the Common Rule, which governs most 
federally funded research involving human subjects, and 
HIPAA’s Privacy Rule, which limits the research use and 
disclosure of certain kinds of health information.10 Generally 
speaking, the Common Rule and HIPAA provide oversight for 
most biobank-related research activities and require 
permission from contributors of specimens or data before 
researchers may take certain actions, including commencement 
of research and disclosure of contributor information.11 Because 
both regulatory schemes depend on deidentification of 
specimens and data as crucial components of their privacy 
protections, both schemes also create obstacles to the 
reidentification necessary as a step for returning IFs and 
IRRs.12 
In this Part we discuss what is required of a biobank 
research system under the Common Rule and HIPAA, and of 
whom it is required. We look at each of the primary regulatory 
regimes and consider the impact on collections sites, biobanks, 
and secondary researchers. We note that various players in the 
                                                          
 10. While other regulatory schemes may bind entities involved in biobank 
research, including the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) rules regulating 
investigations involving human subjects and the Privacy Act, detailed 
consideration of the incentives provided and challenges raised by those 
regulatory schemes are beyond the scope of this article. It suffices to say that 
the incentives and challenges imposed by the FDA regulations are likely to 
diverge significantly from those presented by the Common Rule and HIPAA 
for two reasons. First, the FDA rules do not encourage deidentification in the 
same way that the Common Rule and HIPAA do because FDA does not find 
that the regulatory requirements loosen when specimens and data are 
deidentified. See FDA, GUIDANCE ON IN VITRO DIAGNOSTIC DEVICE STUDIES 
USING LEFTOVER HUMAN SPECIMENS THAT ARE NOT INDIVIDUALLY 
IDENTIFIABLE 6 (Apr. 25, 2006), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/ 
MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/GuidanceDocuments/ucm0712
65.pdf. Second, to the extent that reidentification violates the rules, the FDA 
imposes penalties that are considerably more severe than those that 
accompany violations of the Common Rule and HIPAA. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 
333(a) (2006) (allowing for criminal charges). Similarly, the Privacy Act may 
have some application in this type of research; it requires Federal Agencies to 
provide protections for the collection, use, and dissemination of personally 
identifiable information that is maintained in systems of records under their 
control. It prohibits the disclosure of information that is retrieved by 
individual identifiers without prior consent or notice. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2006). 
 11. See id. 
 12. See infra Parts A & B. 
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biobank system may take steps beyond what the Common Rule 
or HIPAA may require. For example, collection sites frequently 
require recipients of specimens or data to abide by the terms of 
a material transfer agreement (MTA).13 Although MTAs were 
initially developed to clarify the allocation of intellectual 
property rights between the sender and recipient,14 biobanks 
are increasingly using MTAs to address issues of research 
ethics including data privacy.15 
A. REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS UNDER THE COMMON RULE 
The Common Rule was established in 1991 to create 
uniform protection for human research subjects. The Rule 
reaches certain research “conducted, supported or otherwise 
subject to regulation” by fifteen federal agencies, including the 
National Institutes of Health,16 as well as research by any 
institution claiming federal-wide assurance for the protection of 
human subjects by adopting the standards and rules 
articulated in the Common Rule.17 The Common Rule only 
attaches when “research involv[es] human subjects.”18 Both 
“research” and “human subject” have specific definitions under 
the Rule. “Research” is limited to “systematic investigation[s]... 
designed to develop or contribute to the generalizable 
                                                          
 13. See, e.g., MALARIA SPECIMEN BANK, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, 
MATERIAL REQUEST FORM & MATERIAL TRANSFER AGREEMENT 6–9, available 
at http://www.who.int/tdr/research/malaria/rapid_diagnostics/malaria-
material-request-form.pdf. 
 14. See A Quick Guide to Material Transfer Agreements at UC Berkeley, 
UNIV. CAL. BERKELEY, http://www.spo.berkeley.edu/guide/mtaquick.html (last 
visited Mar. 4, 2012). 
 15. See MALARIA SPECIMEN BANK, supra note 13, at 7–8. 
 16. 45 C.F.R.§ 46.101 (2011); see Federal Policy for the Protection of 
Human Subjects (‘Common Rule’), U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., 
http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/humansubjects/commonrule/index.html (last visited 
Apr. 16, 2012) (listing agencies that have adopted the Common Rule). In 
addition to the fifteen agencies adhering to the Common Rule by regulation, 
an executive order applies the Common Rule to the Central Intelligence 
Agency, and the Department of Homeland Security voluntarily complies with 
the Rule. Exec. Order No. 12,333, 46 Fed. Reg. 59,941 (Dec. 4, 1981); 
Regulations, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., 
http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/humansubjects/index.html (last visited Apr.16, 2012). 
 17. Federalwide Assurance (FWA) for the Protection of Human Subjects, 
U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/assurances/ 
assurances/filasurt.html (last updated June 17, 2012). 
 18. 45 C.F.R. § 46.101(a) (2011). 
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knowledge.”19 A “human subject” is defined as “a living 
individual about whom an investigator . . . conducting research 
obtains (1) [d]ata through intervention or interaction with the 
individual, or (2) [i]dentifiable private information.”20 The 
Common Rule further stipulates that private information 
“must be individually identifiable,” meaning that “the identity 
of the subject is or may readily be ascertained by the 
investigator or associated with the information.”21 
Because the Common Rule definition of research requires 
the researcher to acquire individually identifiable private 
information, the Common Rule does not typically regulate 
research involving deidentified information.22 The Office for 
Human Research Protections (OHRP)23 has explained that 
there are two situations in which research involving 
deidentified biospecimens or data does not qualify as human 
subjects research and thus lies outside the scope of the 
Common Rule entirely. These situations arise when the 
deidentified specimens or data were not collected for the 
purposes of that research24 or when the deidentified specimens 
or data were obtained from another institution.25 The Common 
Rule further provides a categorical exemption for “[r]esearch[] 
involving the collection or study of existing data . . . 
pathological specimens, or diagnostic specimens, if . . . the 
information is recorded by the investigator in such a manner 
that subjects cannot be identified, directly or through 
                                                          
 19. 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(d) (2011). 
 20. 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(f) (2011). 
 21. Id. 
 22. It is important to note that under the current regulations, HIPAA and 
the Common Rule use slightly different definitions of “deidentified.” 
Throughout this Article, we use “deidentified” to mean satisfying either the 
Common Rule or HIPAA standard. The mismatching definition may soon be 
irrelevant, as a recent Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking from the 
Department of Health and Human Services proposed that the two standards 
be harmonized. See infra notes 104–110 and accompanying text. 
 23. OHRP is an office within the U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services that provides clarification on regulatory requirements related to 
human subjects research, including extensive guidance interpreting the 
Common Rule. See About OHRP, OFF. FOR HUM. RES. PROTECTIONS, 
http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/about/index.html (last visited Dec. 13, 2011). 
 24. OHRP—Guidance on Research Involving Coded Private Information 
or Biological Specimens, OFF. FOR HUM. RES. PROTECTIONS (Oct. 16, 2008), 
http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/policy/cdebiol.html. 
 25. Guidance on Engagement of Institutions in Human Subjects Research, 
OFF. FOR HUM. RES. PROTECTIONS (Oct. 16, 2008), http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/ 
policy/engage08.html. 
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identifiers linked to the subjects.”26 This exempt category of 
research is different from research identified by OHRP as non-
human subjects research. In the latter case, the research is 
outside of the scope of the Common Rule entirely because it 
does not involve human subjects.27 By contrast, in the former 
case, the research does involve human subjects, but is exempt 
from Common Rule requirements if the researcher refrains 
from recording information about the subjects in identifiable 
form.28 This distinction is important because the DHHS and 
agency heads retain final authority for determining whether a 
particular human subjects research study does in fact qualify 
as exempt under the Common Rule,29 but they have no such 
authority for research that does not involve human subjects. 
The current Common Rule provides three levels of 
independent review for research protocols based on the level of 
risk posed.30 Research studies posing greater than a minimal 
risk31 to subjects require review by a fully convened 
Institutional Review Board (IRB),32 the highest level of 
independent review. Studies posing no more than minimal risk 
are eligible for expedited review,33 which is typically performed 
by a single IRB reviewer who can either approve the protocol or 
find that the protocol poses more than minimal risk and 
requires full IRB review.34 Studies exempt from or outside of 
                                                          
 26. 45 C.F.R. § 46.101(b)(4) (2011). 
 27. See generally Kyle Bertram Brothers & Ellen Wright Clayton, Human 
Non-Subjects Research: Privacy and Compliance, 10 AM. J. BIOETHICS 15–17 
(2010). 
 28. OHRP—Guidance on Research Involving Coded Private Information 
or Biological Specimens, supra note 24. 
 29. 45 C.F.R. § 46.101(c) & (d) (2011). 
 30. Human Subjects Research Protections: Enhancing Protections for 
Research Subjects and Reducing Burden, Delay, and Ambiguity for 
Investigators, 76 Fed. Reg. 44,514 (July 26, 2011) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. 
pts 46, 160, 164, and 21 C.F.R. pts 50, 56). 
 31. 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(i) (2011) (“Minimal risk means that the probability 
and magnitude of harm and discomfort anticipated in the research are not 
greater in and of themselves than those ordinarily encountered in daily life or 
during the performance of routine physical or psychological examinations or 
tests.”). 
 32. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.109 (2011) (outlining the IRB’s responsibilities); 45 
C.F.R. § 46.110 (2011) (allowing expedited review for studies posing no more 
than minimal risk to study subjects). 
 33. A list of categories of research eligible for expedited review is 
published by the Secretary of DHHS. 45 C.F.R. § 46.110(a). 
 34. 45 C.F.R. § 46.110. 
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the Common Rule’s reach comprise the lowest risk category35 
and have no IRB requirements at all.36 
When the Common Rule requires review by a fully-
convened IRB, researchers proposing non-exempt human 
subjects research must obtain approval from the research site’s 
IRB prior to commencing the study.37 The IRB must evaluate 
ethical concerns posed by research protocols involving human 
subjects, approve protocols based on adequate handling of these 
concerns, and provide continuing review and record keeping for 
the duration of the approved research.38 The Common Rule 
specifically directs the IRB to assess a number of factors, 
including: minimization of risks to human subjects; 
reasonability of risks in relation to anticipated benefits, if any; 
adequacy of informed consent; sufficiency of data monitoring; 
and protection of human subjects’ privacy and the 
confidentiality of data.39 The core of the IRB’s charge is to 
oversee the ethical soundness of a research project from the 
initial submission of the protocol all the way through the 
completion of the project and, sometimes, even after completion 
if additional long-term concerns have been identified.40 As 
noted above, when the study poses no more than minimal risks, 
a single IRB reviewer may conduct an expedited review of the 
study.41 
When an institution conducting research that is regulated 
by the Common Rule “materially fail[s] to comply with the 
terms” of the rule, the “department or agency support for any 
project may be terminated or suspended.”42 Thus, the failure to 
obtain compliant informed consent and IRB approval, or failure 
to comply with requirements for an exemption, may result in 
the defunding of the project. Of particular significance for this 
Article, when deidentified information or specimens are 
reidentified, the research now involves human subjects and is 
                                                          
 35. Cf. OHRP—Guidance on Research Involving Coded Private 
Information or Biological Specimens, supra note 28 (instructing that research 
involving deidentified specimens and information does not involve human 
subjects and is therefore not bound by the Common Rule). 
 36. See supra notes 23–29 and accompanying text. 
 37. 45 C.F.R. § 46.109. 
 38. See id. 
 39. 45 C.F.R. § 46.111 (2011). 
 40. See id. 
 41. 45 C.F.R. § 46.110 (2011). 
 42. 45 C.F.R. § 46.123(a) (2011). 
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bound by the Common Rule.43 If the researcher has not 
obtained IRB approval and informed consent from research 
participants, the material terms of the Common Rule have been 
violated and the project may lose its funding.44 
Initial collection sites, biobanks, and downstream 
secondary researchers may be subject to the Common Rule, and 
potentially to IRB oversight, depending on a number of 
conditions, as depicted in Figure 1. Those conditions are: (1) 
whether the research involves newly collected or pre-existing 
specimens and data; (2) whether the entity is conducting 
research; (3) whether the specimens and data are recorded in a 
manner that is individually identifiable; and (4) whether the 
research involves deidentified specimens or data. 
  
                                                          
 43. OHRP—Guidance on Research Involving Coded Private Information 
or Biological Specimens, supra note 28. 
 44. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.123(a). 
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Figure 1. Applicability of the Common Rule to Biobank 
System Entities 
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The first locus where the Common Rule might attach is at 
the initial collection site obtaining new specimens or data.45 
The Common Rule requirements for IRB review and informed 
consent apply when new specimens or data are collected for 
research purposes.46 In the context of a biobank research 
system, these primary collection sites may include typical 
academic or medical research institutions that obtain 
specimens or data for their own primary research studies prior 
to transmitting the specimens or data to a biobank. By 
contrast, clinical collection sites such as hospitals may 
contribute specimens and data to biobanks without ever 
conducting their own research and, thus, would not be 
regulated by the Common Rule.47 As explained below, however, 
clinical sites are more likely than research sites to be covered 
by HIPAA.48 
Downstream researchers using pre-existing collections of 
specimens or data from biobanks for secondary research also 
may be subject to the Common Rule in some circumstances. 
They are required to comply with informed consent and IRB 
review requirements whenever they use pre-existing specimens 
or data that are identified or that might be readily individually 
identified by the investigator under the Common Rule 
definition.49 In some instances, informed consent requirements 
for such secondary studies on identifiable pre-existing 
specimens or data can be satisfied if the original collection site 
obtained general consent for future research, or if the 
secondary researchers’ IRB finds the original consent is 
compatible with the secondary research use.50 Although they 
                                                          
 45. 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(d) (2011). 
 46. See OHRP—Guidance on Research Involving Coded Private 
Information or Biological Specimens, supra note 24. 
 47. Id. at 5. 
 48. See infra notes 66–70 and accompanying text. 
 49. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.101 (2011). 
 50. Sec’y’s Advisory Comm. on Human Research Prots., FAQs, Terms and 
Recommendations on Informed Consent and Research Use of Biospecimens, 
DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. 4 (July 20, 2010), http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/ 
sachrp/commsec/attachmentdfaq%27stermsandrecommendations.pdf.pdf. 
(“The determination of whether a proposed secondary research use is 
compatible with the original consent will be context-specific based on a range 
of considerations. If the original consent form specifically prohibited the 
proposed research activity, it is presumed the research is not allowable. If the 
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technically fall within the scope of the Common Rule, 
downstream researchers recording information in a manner 
that does not allow identification of contributors are exempt 
from the Rule and are not required to obtain informed consent 
and IRB review when using pre-existing specimens or data.51 
On the other hand, secondary researchers are not engaged 
in human subjects research at all when they use pre-existing 
specimens or data that were already deidentified when the 
secondary researcher received them.52 The current Common 
Rule regulations do not require initial collection sites or 
primary researchers to obtain informed consent or IRB review 
for downstream secondary research under any circumstances, 
though some may choose to obtain consent for future research 
as a matter of practice.53 The obligation to obtain informed 
consent or IRB review, if it applies, rests with the secondary 
researcher. 
Finally, biobanks may engage in research activities that 
trigger the Common Rule. Biobanks that collect their own 
specimens or data and conduct their own research are subject 
to the Common Rule in the same fashion as initial collection 
sites.54 Biobanks that conduct their own research but only use 
pre-existing specimens or data are regulated in the same way 
as secondary researchers.55 On the other hand, if they do not 
conduct research themselves and only collect and distribute 
specimens or data for the purpose of downstream research, 
biobanks are not engaged in human subjects research and are 
not subject to the Common Rule.56 
B. REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS UNDER HIPAA 
HIPAA is a broad health care reform law enacted in 1996.57 
                                                          
consent does not prohibit the proposed use, IRBs should consider several 
questions to determine compatibility.”). 
 51. See supra notes 26–29 and accompanying text. 
 52. See OHRP—Guidance on Research Involving Coded Private 
Information or Biological Specimens, supra note 24. 
 53. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.116 (2011) (omitting consent to future research 
from the list of required elements in an informed consent document). 
 54. See supra notes 46–47 and accompanying text. 
 55. See supra notes 49–53 and accompanying text. 
 56. See Guidance on Engagement of Institutions in Human Subjects 
Research, supra note 25. 
 57. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. 
104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
the U.S. Code). 
003 MCGEVERAN FATEHI MCGARRAUGH_PROOF -SK.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 7/5/2012 1:08 PM 
498 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 13.2 
 
 
Among many provisions concerning the adoption of electronic 
medical records, the statute required DHHS to promulgate 
regulations concerning the privacy and security of individuals’ 
personal medical information (provided Congress did not 
legislate further on the issue, which it did not).58 The most 
significant of these rules for reidentification within the biobank 
system was the HIPAA Privacy Rule, finalized in 2002.59 The 
Privacy Rule establishes HIPAA’s requirements applicable to 
certain types of actors when handling certain medical 
information in order to ensure privacy. As discussed below, 
when applicable, HIPAA requires that certain medical 
information not be used or disclosed for research unless the 
researcher has obtained authorization from each potential 
research participant.60 
Two important definitions limit the application of HIPAA. 
First, its requirements apply only to “covered entities,” which 
include health care plans, health care clearinghouses, and 
health care providers—when they transmit health information 
in any electronic form.61 Second, in order to qualify as 
“protected health information” (PHI) and fall within HIPAA 
regulations, health information must be electronically 
transmitted, must relate to an individual’s past, present, or 
future health status or health care, and must individually 
identify a person or provide a reasonable basis for 
reidentification.62 Even if an organization or individual is not a 
covered entity, it may still be bound by HIPAA as a business 
associate if the organization or individual uses or discloses PHI 
when performing certain functions, including data analysis,63 
on behalf of the covered entity.64 
The HIPAA Privacy Rule, like the Common Rule, strongly 
discourages researchers from reidentifying data (or, by 
extension, any accompanying specimens).65 HIPAA starkly 
                                                          
 58. Id. at § 264. 
 59. 45 C.F.R. §§ 160.101–160.552, 162.100–162.1802, 164.102–164.534 
(2011). 
 60. 45 C.F.R. § 164.508(a)(1) (2011). 
 61. 45 C.F.R. § 164.104(a) (2011). 
 62. 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2011). 
 63. Id. 
 64. 45 C.F.R. § 164.504(e) (2011); 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2011). 
 65. Cf. Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health 
Information, 64 Fed. Reg. 59,918, 59,947 (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts 160–
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differentiates deidentified information from personally 
identifiable information, although HIPAA’s definition of 
deidentification departs from the Common Rule’s definition.66 
Under HIPAA, deidentified health information falls outside of 
the definition of PHI entirely and so it is not entitled to the 
protections of the Privacy Rule.67 Deidentification under 
HIPAA can be accomplished in one of two ways. If an expert 
using “generally accepted statistical and scientific principles 
and methods” determines there is a “very small” risk of data 
being reidentified, then the health information is not 
considered PHI.68 Alternatively, health information stripped of 
eighteen specific identifiers listed in the regulation is not 
considered PHI.69 HIPAA allows researchers to retain a code 
linking deidentified specimens or information to their original 
identified sources, but the Privacy Rule prohibits a covered 
entity from using or disclosing the code.70 If a covered entity 
does use the code to reidentify specimens or information, the 
now-identifiable information becomes PHI and the covered 
entity is once again bound by HIPAA in its handling of the 
                                                          
164) (noting the benefits of deidentification in research). 
 66. See OHRP—Guidance on Research Involving Coded Private 
Information or Biological Specimens, supra note 24; see also REPORT OF THE 
PUBLIC RESPONSIBILITY IN MEDICINE AND RESEARCH (PRIM&R) HUMAN 
TISSUE/SPECIMEN WORKING GROUP: PART I ASSESSMENT AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 22 (2007), available at http://www.primr.org/ 
uploadedFiles/PRIMR_Site_Home/Public_Policy/Recently_Files_Comments/Tis
sue%20Banking%20White%20Paper%203-7-07%20final%20combined.pdf. 
 67. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.500(a) (2011) (limiting the applicability of HIPAA 
to protected health information); Stacey A. Tovino, The Use and Disclosure of 
Protected Health Information for Research Under the HIPAA Privacy Rule: 
Unrealized Patient Autonomy and Burdensome Government Regulation, 49 
S.D. L. REV. 447, 455–56 (2003) (“[C]overed entities always are free to use and 
disclose information that does not constitute PHI (i.e., information that is not 
individually identifiable) without regulation by the Privacy Rule.”). 
 68. 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(b)(1) (2011). 
 69. 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(b)(2). These include, for example: names, dates of 
birth and death, most geographic indicators below the state level, various 
forms of contact information, insurance numbers and other identification 
numbers, photos, and certain biometric information. Id. 
 70. 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(c). Under the Public Health Service Act, DHHS 
also has authority to issue certificates of confidentiality to any investigator 
conducting a study that requires IRB-approval under the Common Rule when 
the study involves the identifiable information. However, while HIPAA 
prohibits covered entities from disclosing identifying information, certificates 
of confidentiality only provide investigators the legal right to refuse disclosure. 
They do not prohibit investigators from making voluntary disclosures. 42 
U.S.C. § 241(d) (2006). 
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data.71 
The strongest disincentive to any such reidentification 
comes from HIPAA’s more stringent consent requirements for 
studies involving PHI. Unlike the Common Rule which allows a 
participant to provide general consent to future research, 
HIPAA generally requires a covered entity using PHI to obtain 
individual authorization from each potential research 
participant before use or disclosure of that person’s information 
for research in each research study.72 A HIPAA authorization 
may be combined with the informed consent required by the 
Common Rule.73 Although Common Rule informed consent 
must address a greater scope of potential harms and benefits to 
the human research subject, HIPAA authorizations must 
specifically address risks to an individual’s privacy posed by the 
authorized use or disclosure.74 Critics have argued that these 
requirements inject complex and detailed legalese into consent 
forms and hinder research.75 
Two provisions of HIPAA allow researchers who are 
covered entities to avoid the required individualized 
authorization, even if the information they use qualifies as PHI 
and is not deidentified in accordance with the Privacy Rule. 
                                                          
 71. 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(d)(i)–(ii) (2011). 
 72. 45 C.F.R. § 164.508(b)(3) (2011); 45 C.F.R. § 164.508(a)(1); DEP’T 
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., PROTECTING PERSONAL HEALTH INFORMATION IN 
RESEARCH: UNDERSTANDING THE HIPAA PRIVACY RULE 11 (2003) [hereinafter 
PROTECTING PHI], available at http://privacyruleandresearch.nih.gov/pdf/ 
HIPAA_Booklet_4-14-2003.pdf; see also Secretary’s Advisory Comm. on 
Human Research Protections, FAQs, Terms and Recommendations on 
Informed Consent and Research Use of Biospecimens, DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. 
SERVS, 4 (July 20, 2010), http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/sachrp/commsec/ 
attachmentdfaq%27stermsandrecommendations.pdf.pdf. 
 73. 45 C.F.R. § 164.508(b)(3)(i) (2011). 
 74. PROTECTING PHI, supra note 72, at 11 (“An Authorization differs from 
an informed consent in that an Authorization focuses on privacy risks and 
states how, why, and to whom the PHI will be used and/or disclosed for 
research. An informed consent, on the other hand, provides research subjects 
with a description of the study and of its anticipated risks and/or benefits, and 
a description of how the confidentiality of records will be protected, among 
other things.”). 
 75. See e.g., Norman Fost & Robert J. Levine, Editorial, The 
Dysregulation of Human Subjects Research, 298 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 2196, 2198 
(2007) (noting that the major threat to the proper function of the regulatory 
scheme controlling human subjects research is “the increasing pressure to 
perform tasks that either do not require doing, could be done better by others, 
or could be done more efficiently using expedited review procedures”). 
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First, HIPAA allows covered entities to use or disclose PHI for 
research when the covered entity obtains a waiver of 
authorization either from an IRB or from a similar oversight 
entity contemplated by HIPAA called a Privacy Board.76 
HIPAA directs IRBs and Privacy Boards to grant waivers only 
when three criteria are met: (1) the research poses “no more 
than a minimal risk to the privacy of individuals,” (2) “the 
research could not be practicably conducted without [a] 
waiver,” and (3) “the research could not be practicably 
conducted without . . . [the use of PHI].”77 Second, the 
researcher need not obtain contributor authorization to use a 
“limited data set” instead of deidentified health information.78 
Unlike deidentified health information, a limited data set may 
retain information about the individual’s residence, including 
town, city, or zip code, and information about specific dates 
associated with the contributor, including birth date, admission 
date, and date of death.79 A limited data set must be 
accompanied by a data use agreement which identifies “the 
permitted uses and disclosures” of the information contained in 
the limited data set.80 The agreement may not permit the 
recipient of the limited data set to violate the requirements of 
HIPAA, and it must prohibit the recipient from identifying the 
information or contacting the contributor.81 
A researcher entity’s failure to comply with HIPAA may 
have serious consequences. Federal statutes provide for both 
criminal and civil penalties if a covered entity violates 
HIPAA.82 Researchers violate the HIPAA Privacy Rule if they 
disclose or obtain PHI without prior authorization, unless they 
fall into an exception under the Rule such as those discussed 
above.83 Potential penalties are severe.84 While historically the 
                                                          
 76. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(i)(1)(i) (2011). 
 77. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(i)(2)(ii) (2011). 
 78. 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(e) (2011). 
 79. Compare 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(e)(2)(ii) (2011) (setting up the 
requirements for a limited data set) with § 164.514(b)(2)(i)(C) (2011) (setting 
up the requirements for deidentification). 
 80. 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(e)(4)(ii)(A) (2011). 
 81. 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(e)(4)(ii)(C)(5). 
 82. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320d-5, 1320d-6 (2006). 
 83. 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6(a). 
 84. Civil penalties range from $100 fines for unintentional violations to 
$50,000 fines for those whose violation is the result of “willful neglect.” 42 
U.S.C. § 1320d-5(a)(1)(C)(ii). Violations of HIPAA committed with “false 
pretenses” may be punished with criminal charges carrying a penalty of up to 
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number of criminal prosecutions and civil fines under HIPAA 
has been quite small, responsible institutions presumably 
ensure their compliance with these legal requirements 
regardless of the likelihood of sanctions.85 
In general, players in the biobank research system are be 
bound by HIPAA if they are (1) a covered entity or a business 
associate of a covered entity, and (2) using or disclosing 
information that meets the definition of PHI.86 The original 
collection site is a covered entity if it provides health care at 
the time of the collection and transmits PHI in an electronic 
form.87 Biobanks themselves may be housed within a covered 
entity such as an academic health center, clinic, or hospital; 
and if so they could be regulated by HIPAA when they use or 
disclose PHI.88 Downstream researchers may be bound by 
HIPAA if they conduct research using PHI on behalf of a 
covered entity as a business associate.89 Finally, downstream 
researchers, even if they are not directly regulated by HIPAA, 
may receive PHI from a covered entity that must comply with 
HIPAA and must ensure that recipients of certain information 
do likewise.90 
Similarly, much of the information studied in genetic or 
                                                          
five years in prison. 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6(b)(2). Those committed with the 
intent to garner personal gain or commercial advantage may result in a 
penalty of up to ten years in prison. 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6(b)(3). 
 85. See Al Franken, Sen., Opening Statement from Hearing on Health 
Information Privacy (Nov. 8, 2011), available at 
http://www.franken.senate.gov/?p=news&id=1835 (indicating that the federal 
government has pursued sixteen criminal prosecutions, levied one civil 
monetary penalty, and reached six settlements involving monetary payments 
under HIPAA’s privacy and security regulations). 
 86. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.500(a) (2011) (“[T]he standards, requirements, and 
implementation specifications of this subpart apply to covered entities with 
respect to protected health information.”). 
 87. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., RESEARCH REPOSITORIES, DATABASES, 
AND THE HIPAA PRIVACY RULE 1 (Jan. 12, 2004) [hereinafter DOH HIPAA], 
available at 
http://privacyruleandresearch.nih.gov/pdf/research_repositories_final.pdf. 
 88. Id. (“Researchers are not themselves covered entities, unless they are 
also health care providers and engage in any of the covered electronic 
transactions. If, however, researchers are employees or other workforce 
members of a covered entity (e.g., a covered hospital or health insurer), they 
may have to comply with that entity’s HIPAA privacy policies and 
procedures.”). 
 89. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.504(e) (2011). 
 90. Id. 
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genomic research will be PHI, assuming it was transmitted 
electronically. Although HIPAA does not directly attach to 
human biological specimens themselves, HIPAA does protect 
human research subjects against informational risks by 
limiting how covered entities may use or disclose PHI, 
including information attached to biological specimens.91 When 
information attached to biological specimens is individually 
identifiable or provides a basis for reidentification, the 
information qualifies as PHI.92 If a biobank or a downstream 
researcher is a covered entity or the business associate of a 
covered entity, and the research involves PHI, the biobank or 
downstream researcher must comply with HIPAA’s privacy 
protections.93 
Players in the biobank research system who are covered by 
HIPAA may relieve their regulatory burdens by availing 
themselves of Privacy Board waivers or limited data sets.94 
Because the informational risks generally associated with 
biobanking research are considered less serious than physical 
or psychological risks associated with interventional research 
studies, biobanks and downstream researchers are likely to 
seek, and qualify for, HIPAA authorization waivers.95 
Similarly, downstream researchers who would otherwise be 
bound by HIPAA’s requirement of individualized authorization 
may use or disclose partially deidentified information included 
in limited data sets provided they agree to the limited data 
set’s terms of use. 
                                                          
 91. 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(a) (2011); DOH HIPPA, supra note 90, at 11; cf. 
Human Subjects Research Protections: Enhancing Protections for Research 
Subjects and Reducing Burden, Delay, and Ambiguity for Investigators, 76 
Fed. Reg. 44,512, 44,513–14 (July 26, 2011) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts 46, 
160, 164, and 21 C.F.R. pts 50, 56) (“[I]ncreasing use of genetic information, 
existing (i.e., stored) biospecimens, medical records, and administrative claims 
data in research has changed the nature of the risks and benefits of research 
participation. Risks related to these types of research are not physical but 
informational (e.g., resulting from the unauthorized release of information 
about subjects).”). 
 92. See 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2011) (defining PHI). 
 93. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.500(a), 164.504(e) (2011). 
 94. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(i)(1) (2011). 
 95. See Human Subjects Research Protections: Enhancing Protections for 
Research Subjects and Reducing Burden, Delay, and Ambiguity for 
Investigators, 76 Fed. Reg. at 44,514, 44,516 (stating that the intensity of IRB 
review should be directly related to the severity of the risk posed by the 
research and proposing that studies posing only informational risks should 
undergo a standardized review process instead of being overseen by a fully 
convened IRB). 
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III. REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS UNDER THE 
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE COMMON RULE 
Given the complexity of requirements and exemptions 
under the Common Rule and HIPAA, DHHS has recently 
issued an advance notice of proposed rulemaking (ANPRM) 
seeking to improve protections for human subjects and to 
streamline regulations for researchers.96 An ANPRM, of course, 
represents only a first step in the complex process for amending 
existing regulations, and the content of final rules may differ 
significantly from this initial proposal.97 Nevertheless, an 
ANPRM reveals a great deal about an agency’s thinking 
heading into a rulemaking. In this instance, many issues 
relevant to the return of individual research findings are not 
addressed in the ANPRM and others become even more 
complicated. Overall, an amended Common Rule along the 
lines of the ANPRM would create even greater disincentives for 
researchers interested in reidentifying data or specimens for 
the purpose of returning IFs or IRRs. 
If adopted, the rules in the ANPRM would cover more 
research than the Common Rule and HIPAA now reach. Under 
current law, the Common Rule only applies to “research 
involving human subjects” that is conducted or supported by a 
federal agency that has adopted the Rule, or by an institution 
claiming a federal-wide assurance.98 The ANPRM would extend 
the application of the rule to all research involving human 
subjects conducted at “domestic institutions that receive some 
Federal funding from a Common Rule agency.”99 Many entities 
within biobank research systems conduct at least some human 
                                                          
 96. Id. at 44,512. 
 97. Under the Administrative Procedure Act, an agency must provide 
notice of the content of a proposed rule before the rule is promulgated and goes 
into effect. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (2006). The Act requires only a notice of proposed 
rulemaking (NPRM), but if an agency particularly desires public input on a 
rule or additional time to ventilate an issue, the agency may opt to issue an 
ANPRM prior to publishing an NPRM. Bridget C.E. Dooling, Legal Issues in 
E-Rulemaking, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 893, 897–98 (2011). The ANPRM is not 
binding and the agency retains the discretion to change the content of the 
proposed rule presented in the ANPRM. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(c)–(d) (requiring 
public opportunity to comment on proposed rules and requiring the agency to 
respond to those comments). 
 98. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.101 (2011). 
 99. Human Subjects Research Protections: Enhancing Protections for 
Research Subjects and Reducing Burden, Delay, and Ambiguity for 
Investigators, 76 Fed. Reg. at 44,528. 
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subjects research funded by NIH or other federal agencies that 
adhere to the Common Rule; if this portion of the ANPRM 
survives to a final regulation, such entities would be required 
to adhere to the Common Rule in all of their human subjects 
research activities, however funded. 
The ANPRM identifies seven areas of concern with the 
existing Common Rule (see Table 1). While the scope of the 
ANPRM is broad, six of these seven areas of concern addressed 
by the proposed rule have a direct or indirect effect on biobank 
research entities. These proposed changes and their effects are 
discussed in the sections below. 
 
Table 1 Seven Identified Areas of Concern with the Current  
Common Rule 
1 Poor calibration between the level of review required and the level
and type of risks posed by research studies; 
2 Undue bureaucratic complexity, inefficiency, and delay resulting
from multiple IRBs reviews for multi-site studies; 
3 Ineffective protections for human subjects resulting from current
informed consent requirements; 
4 Insufficient harmonization between the Common Rule and HIPAA
given the limited applicability of HIPAA; 
5 Inadequate collection of information necessary for evaluating the
effectiveness of the human subject research oversight system; 
6 Under inclusive protection of all human research subjects resulting
from the inapplicability of current human subject research
regulations to non-federally funded research; and 
7 Multiplicative, inconsistent, and unclear regulatory requirements
resulting in problematic variations across institutions and IRBs. 
A. HARMONIZATION BETWEEN THE COMMON RULE AND HIPAA 
The ANPRM proposes that the limited applicability of 
HIPAA combined with the Common Rule’s looser definitions of 
“identifiable” and “deidentified” inadequately protect data and, 
thus, do not minimize informational risks to subjects.100 To 
address this gap, the ANPRM would have the Common Rule 
adopt HIPAA’s standards regarding what constitutes 
individually identifiable information, limited data sets, and 
deidentified information.101 The ANPRM also suggests a 
reevaluation of the particular identifiers that would have to be 
                                                          
 100. Id. at 44,525. 
 101. Id. 
003 MCGEVERAN FATEHI MCGARRAUGH_PROOF -SK.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 7/5/2012 1:08 PM 
506 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 13.2 
 
 
removed for information to be considered deidentified under 
both regulatory regimes.102 The ANPRM points out that 
“[r]egardless of what information is removed, it is possible to 
extract DNA from a biospecimen itself and potentially link it to 
otherwise available data to identify individuals” and indicates 
that DHHS is “considering categorizing all research involving 
the primary collection of biospecimens as well as storage and 
secondary analysis of existing biospecimens as research 
involving identifiable information.”103 
In addition to harmonizing these definitions, the ANPRM 
proposes that researchers using deidentified information or 
limited-data sets would be “strictly prohibited from attempting 
to reidentify the subjects of the information.”104 Furthermore, 
because many investigators rely on third-party experts to 
remove identifiers instead of recording information in an 
unidentifiable manner themselves, the ANPRM would allow 
that “data could be considered deidentified or in limited data 
set form even if investigators see the identifiers but do not 
record them in the permanent research file.”105 If promulgated, 
the ANPRM’s harmonization of definitions and requirements 
under HIPAA and the Common Rule would likely simplify 
compliance for those collection sites, biobanks, and downstream 
researchers that were already bound by both regulatory 
schemes. Because biobanks and downstream researchers are 
less likely to be covered entities or the business associates of 
covered entities than are collection sites, they are less likely to 
be subject to HIPAA in the first place. For these entities, the 
proposed harmonization of HIPAA and the Common Rule 
would introduce additional regulatory burdens because these 
entities would effectively be required to comply with both 
HIPAA and the Common Rule. 
B. SHIFT FROM “EXEMPT” CATEGORIES OF RESEARCH TO 
“EXCUSED” CATEGORIES OF RESEARCH 
As noted above, the existing Common Rule varies the 
degree of IRB oversight based on a tiered structure of assessed 
risk for research subjects. The ANPRM identifies several 
                                                          
 102. Id. at 44,525–26. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. at 44,526. 
 105. Id. 
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concerns about the poor alignment of these review categories 
with actual levels of risk posed by different types of studies. 
Among these concerns, the ANPRM contends, is the mismatch 
between IRB review and the informational risks associated 
with the inappropriate use or disclosure of subjects’ 
information.106 The ANPRM states that these informational 
risks are “correlated with . . . the degree of identifiability of the 
information” and are almost exclusively due to “inadequate 
data security.”107 The ANPRM further states that IRB review of 
research posing informational risks is both unnecessary and 
inadequate because IRB members may lack the necessary 
expertise regarding data security and “review of informational 
risks is an inefficient use of an IRB’s time.”108 Instead, the 
ANPRM suggests that “[s]tandardized data protections . . . may 
be a more effective way to minimize informational risks.”109 
The ANPRM would impose “mandatory standards for data 
security and information protection . . . calibrated to the level of 
identifiability”110 of the information “whenever data are 
collected, generated, stored, or used.”111 These mandatory data 
security standards would be the basis for several subsidiary 
changes to when and how IRB review is required, many of 
which would affect biobank research entities. 
The most significant changes proposed by the ANPRM 
would pertain to the types of research activities that are and 
are not exempt from Common Rule requirements. While the 
current Common Rule provides that research involving 
“existing data, documents, records, pathological specimens, or 
diagnostic specimens, . . . if the information is recorded by the 
investigator in such a manner that subjects cannot be 
identified” is exempt from all requirements,112 the proposed 
rule would require these studies to comply with new mandatory 
data security standards.113 The ANPRM frames this proposed 
change as “moving away from the concept of exempt [research 
                                                          
 106. Id. at 44,516. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. 45 C.F.R. § 46.101(b)(4) (2011). 
 113. Human Subjects Research Protections: Enhancing Protections for 
Research Subjects and Reducing Burden, Delay, and Ambiguity for 
Investigators, 76 Fed. Reg. at 44,518. 
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studies]” to a category of research studies “excused” from IRB 
review.114 
Because this shift would increase protections for subjects, 
the ANPRM argues that the proposed “excused” category would 
include more types of studies than the current “exempt” 
category.115 Thus, the ANPRM proposes that the current 
exemption for research on pre-existing specimens or data be 
expanded to include specimens and data that were “collected 
for purposes other than the proposed research” instead of being 
limited to data or specimens that existed at the time the study 
was commenced.116 Furthermore, it proposes that the current 
limitation on investigators recording identifying information be 
eliminated “unless there are plans to provide individual results 
back to the subjects,” in which case the study would be 
ineligible for excused status altogether.117 
If promulgated, the ANPRM would require fully convened 
IRBs to review research that does not qualify as excused under 
the proposed changes to the Common Rule.118 However, with 
the adoption of mandatory data security standards, IRBs would 
only assess the ethical dimensions of these research protocols, 
and would no longer be responsible for assessing their 
information risks.119 Furthermore, while the current Common 
Rule generally requires IRBs to provide ongoing review of such 
research studies,120 the ANPRM proposes that continuing 
review would not be required “[w]here the remaining activities 
in a study are limited to . . . data analysis (even if identifiers 
are retained)” unless the IRB decides that ongoing review is 
necessary.121 Research that qualifies as excused under the 
proposed Common Rule would be subject to several new 
requirements in addition to mandatory data security 
standards.122 These requirements are discussed in the following 
                                                          
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. at 44,519. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. at 44,516. 
 119. Id. 
 120. 45 C.F.R. § 46.109(e) (2011). 
 121. Human Subjects Research Protections: Enhancing Protections for 
Research Subjects and Reducing Burden, Delay, and Ambiguity for 
Investigators, 76 Fed. Reg. at 44,516. 
 122. 45 C.F.R. § 46.101(b) (2011). 
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section and provided in Table 2 reproduced from the ANPRM. 
C. INFORMED CONSENT AND IRB REGISTRATION 
Under the current Common Rule, exempt categories of 
research are not subject to IRB review or informed consent 
requirements. Under the proposed amendments, IRB review 
still would not be required for excused categories of research.123 
However, to facilitate tracking and auditing of excused studies, 
researchers would be required to register these studies with an 
IRB using a brief form.124 This form would allow institutions to 
identify those rare instances where an excused study might 
require expedited or full IRB review. 
The proposed rules also change informed consent 
requirements, especially for secondary research. The Common 
Rule and HIPAA now do not require consent or authorization 
for secondary research involving deidentified specimens and 
data if they were obtained from another institution or were 
collected for purposes other than the proposed research.125 
Those same regimes do require secondary researchers to obtain 
informed consent for research on identifiable specimens and 
data.126 Under the Common Rule, it may be possible for 
researchers to obtain informed consent for future research on 
identifiable specimens and data under certain circumstances, 
while HIPAA does not allow for such general authorizations.127 
The ANPRM proposes taking a middle ground on these issues 
and simplifying these requirements by requiring informed 
consent for a broader range of secondary research while 
allowing that consent to be obtained at the point of primary 
collection.128 Under these proposed rules “the allowable current 
practice of telling the subjects, during the initial research 
consent, that the data they are providing will be used for one 
                                                          
 123. Human Subjects Research Protections: Enhancing Protections for 
Research Subjects and Reducing Burden, Delay, and Ambiguity for 
Investigators, 76 Fed. Reg. at 44,516. 
 124. Id. at 44,515. 
 125. OHRP—Guidance on Research Involving Coded Private Information 
or Biological Specimens, supra note 24; Guidance on Engagement of 
Institutions in Human Subjects Research, supra note 25. 
 126. See supra text accompanying notes 18–21. 
 127. Secretary’s Advisory Comm. on Human Research Protections, supra 
note 50, at 6. 
 128. Human Subjects Research Protections: Enhancing Protections for 
Research Subjects and Reducing Burden, Delay, and Ambiguity for 
Investigators, 76 Fed. Reg. at 44,519–20, 44,525.  
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purpose, and then after stripping identifiers, allowing it to be 
used for a new purpose to which the subjects never consented, 
would not be allowed.”129 The ANPRM further provides that 
these consent requirements would be able to be satisfied in 
most cases at the time of the initial collection of specimens and 
data by having subjects consent to or reject participation in 
future research.130 In instances requiring more specific consent, 
such as cell line or reproductive research, this initial consent 
form would provide check-boxes allowing subjects to opt in or 
out of particular types of research.131 
Under these proposed amendments, some research 
currently “exempt” from the Common Rule would be “excused” 
from IRB review but potentially subject to new informed 
consent requirements.132 Those new requirements would 
depend on the original purpose for which the specimens and 
data were collected and their level of identifiability.133 Most 
significantly for our purposes, as explained above, the ANPRM 
potentially considers regarding all biospecimens as identifiable 
under the amended Common Rule regardless of whether 
identifiers are stripped.134 The proposed rules might then 
require informed consent for all biospecimens and identifiable 
data regardless of whether they were originally collected for 
research or non-research purposes, but would allow for that 
consent to be acquired at the time of initial collection.135 For 
research on limited data sets and deidentified data, informed 
consent would be required unless the data was originally 
collected for a non-research purpose.136 The ANPRM states that 
these informed consent requirements would only apply 
prospectively to specimens and data collected after the 
potential adoption of new rules.137 
                                                          
 129. Id. at 44,519. 
 130. Id. 
 131. The ANPRM states that “[p]articipation in a research study (such as a 
clinical trial) could not be conditioned on agreeing to allow future open-ended 
research using a biospecimen.” Id. at 44,520. 
 132. Id. at 44,419. 
 133. Id. at 44,525. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. at 44,519. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. at 44,520. 
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D. SUMMARY: THE POTENTIAL IMPACT OF THE ANPRM 
 
Table 2. Proposal for the Excused Category of Research Involving 
Pre-Existing Information or Biospecimens (reproduced from 
ANPRM) 
 Identifiable 
information 
and all 
biospecimens 
Limited data 
set (as defined 
in the HIPAA 
Privacy Rule) 
De-identified 
information 
(as defined in 
the HIPAA 
Privacy Rule) 
Written  
consent  
required for 
future  
research with 
material  
collected for 
non-research 
purposes? 
Yes, which could 
be obtained in 
connection with 
the initial  
collection. 
No consent  
required. 
No consent  
required. 
Consent for 
future  
research with 
material  
collected for 
research  
purposes? 
Yes. Consent for 
future research 
typically  
obtained at the 
same time as 
consent for  
initial research 
(which, for data, 
could be oral 
when oral  
consent was 
permissible for 
the initial  
collection). 
Yes. Same rules 
as for 
“Identifiable 
Information and 
All 
Biospecimens.” 
Yes. Same rule 
as for 
“Identifiable 
Information and 
All 
Biospecimens.” 
Standardized 
Data  
Protections?*  
Yes. Protections 
would include 
encryption, use 
only by 
authorized 
personnel with 
audit  
tracing, prompt 
breach  
notification, and 
periodic  
retrospective 
random audits. 
Yes. Same rules 
as for 
“Identifiable 
Information and 
All 
Biospecimens” 
plus a 
prohibition 
against re-
identification. 
Yes. Protection 
would include 
prohibition on 
re-identification. 
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Table 2. Proposal for the Excused Category of Research Involving 
Pre-Existing Information or Biospecimens (reproduced from 
ANPRM) 
Registration of 
research with 
IRB or  
research  
office? 
Yes. Yes. No. 
Prior review 
by IRB or  
research  
office? 
No, unless 
investigators 
plan to re-
contact subjects 
with their 
individual 
research results. 
No. No. 
* These data protections are discussed in the context of secondary research 
uses of biospecimens and data which present mostly informational risks 
rather than physical risks to participants. However, as indicated elsewhere 
in this ANPRM, informational risks will always be present where data and 
biospecimens are collected, thus requiring these data protections to be 
applied to any such research. 
 
When crystallized, these proposed amendments would 
have varied effects on the level of regulation on primary 
collection sites, biobanks, and secondary researchers. In 
general, primary collection sites would face an increased 
regulatory burden because the proposed rule would require 
them to collect informed consent for any secondary research at 
the time they obtain informed consent for the initial 
research.138 If they are not also primary collection sites, 
biobanks and secondary researchers would have mixed results: 
they would be less closely regulated in some respects and more 
closely regulated in others. Those using deidentified specimens 
and data initially collected for research purposes, a class is 
which is currently entirely exempt, would face regulation under 
the proposed rule.139 They would have to register their studies 
with an IRB and obtain informed consent from research 
participants.140 However, the regulatory burdens would 
                                                          
 138. See id. at 44,519. 
 139. See id. at 44,518–19. 
 140. See id. at 45,419. 
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generally decrease for secondary researchers and biobanks 
conducting research on identifiable specimens and data. Under 
the current rules this category of researchers is required to 
submit to IRB review and approval;141 under the proposed 
rules, they would merely be required to register studies with 
the IRB.142 Taken together, these changes in regulatory 
coverage would further increase the already strong incentive to 
deidentify most specimens and data used in the biobank 
research system. As noted above, the expanded Common Rule 
would cover more research, and all Common Rule 
deidentification standards would shift to the generally more 
stringent HIPAA standards. The next Part delves into the 
challenges facing the biobank research system under both the 
existing and the potential revised regulations. 
IV. THE MUTUAL AND CONCURRENT CHALLENGES OF 
RETURNING INDIVIDUAL FINDINGS FROM BIOBANK 
AND SECONDARY RESEARCH UNDER CURRENT AND 
PROPOSED REGULATIONS 
Returning IFs and IRRs from the biobank research system 
to contributors of specimens and data poses a twofold 
challenge. First, the Common Rule and HIPAA explicitly 
address neither the return of individual findings from research 
nor the responsibilities of different biobank research entities 
and oversight bodies involved in such returns.143 Consequently, 
biobank research entities—and the IRBs and Privacy Boards 
that oversee them—face considerable regulatory uncertainty 
when deciding whether to return findings.144 In this 
atmosphere, it is likely that many will avoid legal risk and lean 
against returning results, notwithstanding any of the ethical 
arguments favoring return in some circumstances. The second 
and perhaps more significant challenge is that these 
regulations, and especially the proposed amendments to the 
Common Rule, in many ways do discourage the return of 
findings. In particular, the strong and increasing emphasis on 
                                                          
 141. See supra notes 18–21 and accompanying text. 
 142. See Human Subjects Research Protections: Enhancing Protections for 
Research Subjects and Reducing Burden, Delay, and Ambiguity for 
Investigators, 76 Fed. Reg. at 44519. 
 143. Susan M. Wolf et al., The Law of Incidental Findings in Human 
Subjects Research: Establishing Researchers’ Duties, 36 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 
361, 362 (2008) [hereinafter Law of Incidental Findings]. 
 144. Id. at 364. 
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robust deidentification standards generally deters return of 
results. More broadly, the principles and goals of the research 
oversight system diverge considerably from those of proponents 
of returning individual findings. 
In this Part, we first discuss the sources and consequences 
of the emerging disparity between the philosophy of the 
regulations and the increased openness to returning individual 
research findings from biobank research. Second, we illustrate 
how current and proposed regulations under the Common Rule 
and HIPAA present practical challenges for biobank research 
entities contemplating returning results. 
A. THE EMERGING DISPARITY IN THINKING ABOUT RETURN OF 
RESULTS 
The Common Rule provides several criteria by which IRBs 
are to evaluate proposed research involving human subjects: 
minimization of risks to human subjects; reasonability of risks 
in relation to anticipated benefits, if any; adequacy of informed 
consent; sufficiency of data monitoring; and protection of 
human subjects’ privacy and the confidentiality of data.145 
While risks can vary depending on the nature of the research 
and human subject group146 (and while the Common Rule itself 
does not define “risks”), guidance for IRBs has typically 
identified potential risks to subjects as physical, psychological, 
economic, and social.147 According to OHRP’s predecessor, the 
Office for the Protection from Research Risks, concerns 
associated with subjects’ privacy and confidentiality of data are 
“of a somewhat different character” than these other risks.148 
                                                          
 145. 45 C.F.R. § 46.111 (2011). 
 146. For example, children, prisoners, and pregnant women have been 
identified as human subject groups facing unique risks as human research 
subjects. Additional Protections for Pregnant Women, Human Fetuses and 
Neonates Involved in Research, 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.201–46.207 (2011); Additional 
Protections Pertaining to Biomedical and Behavior Research Involving 
Prisoners as Subjects, 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.301–306; Additional Protections for 
Children Involved as Subjects in Research, 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.401–46.409. 
 147. OFFICE FOR THE PROTECTION FROM RESEARCH RISKS, INSTITUTIONAL 
REVIEW BOARD GUIDEBOOK ch. III (1993), available at 
http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/archive/irb/irb_chapter3.htm#e1. 
 148. Id. Although this guidance is now considered an archived material 
and has not been updated since 1993, its analysis of risks to research subjects 
does not appear to be outdated and has been reiterated in subsequent DHHS 
publications, including the ANPRM. 
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Invasion of privacy typically involves “covert” research or 
“access to a person’s body or behavior without consent,” and 
confidentiality of data pertains to “safeguarding information 
that has been given voluntarily by one person to another.”149 
This distinction between risks to subjects and concerns about 
privacy and confidentiality may explain a corresponding 
division both in regulatory treatment and in commentary about 
related bioethical issues that arise in genetic and genomic 
research. 
The first category of issues, which we will call the “return 
of results” category, has focused on the emerging challenges 
posed by rapid technological advancements that allow 
researchers to produce significant amounts of information, 
including IRRs and IFs, about contributors of specimens and 
data.150 The advent of new capability, such as genomic 
microarrays enabling the sequencing of whole genomes, 
presents new ethical, legal, and regulatory challenges.151 
Commentary in this category has taken the form of debate 
about whether IRRs and IFs constitute any research benefits or 
risks to contributors, whether researchers have any ethical or 
legal duty to return IRRs and IFs to contributors,152 and, if so, 
how returns of IRRs and IFs should be managed by 
researchers, IRBs, and oversight authorities such as OHRP.153 
Proponents of return of results have argued that IRRs and IFs 
of clinical significance to donors are a foreseeable outcome of 
research that presents both pertinent benefits and risks. As 
explained by Wolf et al.: 
For a research participant recruited as a normal control, discovery of 
an IF suggesting pathology may trigger anxiety, burdens, and the 
costs of further evaluation to verify or rule out a clinical problem. 
Even research participants with known pathology risk discovery of an 
unrelated IF, triggering the same. . . . [S]ome IFs will lead to 
diagnoses of clinical importance. . . . For such a research participant, 
taking part in the study imposes both the risk of discovering an IF 
                                                          
 149. Id. 
 150. E.g., Amy L. McGuire & James R. Lupski, Personal Genome Research: 
What Should the Participant Be Told?, 26 TRENDS GENETICS 199, 200 (2010) 
(arguing that in the direct-to-consumer genetic sequencing industry, results 
should only be returned “in a way . . . that the potential benefits of receiving 
the research results outweigh any potential harm”). 
 151. See, e.g., id. 
 152. E.g., Law of Incidental Findings, supra note 151, at 362. 
 153. E.g., Susan M. Wolf et al., Managing Incidental Findings in Human 
Subjects Research: Analysis and Recommendations, 36 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 
219, 230 tbl. 3 (2008) [hereinafter Analysis and Recommendations]. 
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and potential benefit of discovering serious pathology in time to 
intervene. 154 
Proponents further argue that, in order to satisfy the 
regulatory mandates for minimizing risks and reasonably 
balancing risks and benefits, IRBs need to assess whether a 
research protocol has the potential to produce IFs of clinical 
significance to donors.155 If so, the argument runs, then 
informed consent documents should provide adequate 
information to subjects about the benefits and risks of IFs and 
whether adequate procedures are proposed to address when 
and how returns of IFs will take place.156 While the Common 
Rule does not explicitly address the issue of return of results, 
debate about the issue has resulted in recommendations for 
researchers, IRBs, and regulatory authorities like OHRP, from 
several groups including the National Bioethics Advisory 
Commission,157 NIH’s National Heart, Lung, and Blood 
Institute,158 and the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention.159 These recommendations have focused mostly on 
criteria for deciding whether IRRs and IFs ought to be 
returned.160 The recommendations are oriented almost 
                                                          
 154. Id. at 227. 
 155. See, e.g., Nat’l Human Genome Research Inst. (NHGRI), Informed 
Consent Elements Tailored to Genomics Research, 
http://www.genome.gov/27026589 (last updated February 19, 2012) (“The 
decision on whether to return research results to participants . . . should be 
made by the study investigator in consultation with his/her IRB.”). 
 156. See, e.g., NIMH COUNCIL WORKGROUP ON MRI RESEARCH PRACTICES, 
MRI RESEARCH SAFETY AND ETHICS: POINTS TO CONSIDER (Sept. 14, 2005), 
available at http://www.nimh.nih.gov/about/advisory-boards-and-
groups/namhc/reports/mri-research-safety-ethics.pdf (recommending that 
researchers “explicitly discuss[ ] the potential for incidental findings and 
associated risks, . . . inform[ ] the participant as to whether or not the scans 
will be reviewed by a clinician qualified to render a radiological interpretation, 
and . . . describe[ ] the path that will be taken in the event that an incidental 
finding occurs”). 
 157. E.g., NAT’L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM’N, RESEARCH INVOLVING 
HUMAN BIOLOGICAL MATERIALS: ETHICAL ISSUES AND POLICY GUIDANCE 71–
72 (1999), available at http://www.bioethics.georgetown.edu/nbac/hbm.pdf. 
 158. E.g., Richard R. Fabsitz et al., Special Reports, Ethical and Practical 
Guidelines for Reporting Genetic Research Results to Study Participants: 
Updated Guidelines from an NHLBI Working Group, 3 CIRCULATION: 
CARDIOVASCULAR GENETICS 574 (2010). 
 159. E.g., Laura M. Beskow et al., Informed Consent for Population-Based 
Research Involving Genetics, 286 JAMA 2315, 2319 (2001). 
 160. E.g., Fabsitz et. al, supra note 158. 
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exclusively toward primary researchers.161 Despite this ongoing 
discussion, the recent ANPRM does not substantively address 
this category of issues.162 
The second category of issues, which we will call the 
“biobank oversight” category, has focused on the regulatory 
challenges presented by the rise of large-scale biobanks that 
amass biospecimens and genetic data for future research use by 
secondary researchers. Commentators in this arena have been 
concerned not with physical and psychological risks to 
contributors, but with such issues as the limits of informed 
consent for future research using contributors’ stored 
specimens and data,163 the data security and contributor 
privacy implications of transferring stored specimens and data 
through the biobank system,164 and matters of ownership and 
custodianship of stored specimens and data.165 As prior sections 
of this paper have shown, existing regulations including the 
Common Rule and HIPAA explicitly address many of these 
issues, as does the ANPRM.166 
It is only very recently that these two categories of issues 
have begun to converge and commentators have started 
considering the complexity of issues surrounding IRRs and IFs 
arising within the complexity of the biobank research system. 
The consensus paper at the center of this symposium examines 
this point of convergence.167 Even here, the recommendations 
are limited because the paper suggests only that contributors 
should be offered returns of clinically significant IRRs and IFs 
when feasible.168 Yet the regulations discussed above, 
particularly as they relate to deidentification, profoundly affect 
                                                          
 161. E.g., NATIONAL BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM’N supra note 157; Beskow 
et al., supra note 159; Fabsitz et. al, supra note 158. 
 162. See generally Human Subjects Research Protections: Enhancing 
Protections for Research Subjects and Reducing Burden, Delay, and 
Ambiguity for Investigators, 76 Fed. Reg. 44,512 (July 26, 2011) (to be codified 
at 45 C.F.R. pts 46, 160, 164, and 21 C.F.R. pts 50, 56). 
 163. See, e.g., David Wendler, One-Time General Consent for Research on 
Biological Samples: Is it Compatible with the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act?, 166 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1449, 1451 (2006). 
 164. E.g., Mark A. Rothstein, Is Deidentification Sufficient to Protect 
Health Privacy in Research?, 10 AM. J. BIOETHICS 3, 6 (2010). 
 165. E.g., R. Alta Charo, Body of Research—Ownership and Use of Human 
Tissue, 355 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1517, 1518–19 (2006). 
 166. For example, see notes 73–76 and accompanying text for an 
explanation of the limits of authorization under HIPAA. 
 167. Id. at 1–3. 
 168. Id. at 18. 
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the feasibility of any potential return. In order for return of 
results to take place, the IRB needs to evaluate the criteria for 
return, the adequacy of informed consent, and the procedures 
for re-contact.169 Additionally, it must be possible to identify 
(or, more likely, reidentify) the contributors to whom 
returnable results are linked. 
For example, Common Rule requirements for IRB review 
and informed consent typically will not apply to research on 
deidentified stored specimens and data; such studies either are 
not human subjects research or are exempt from Common 
Rule.170 More fundamentally, reidentification negates 
researchers’ exemptions under both the Common Rule and 
HIPAA.171 Some biobanks like BioVu irretrievably deidentify 
specimens and data, making reidentification impossible.172 
Even in cases where collection sites and biobanks do retain the 
code for deidentified specimens and data, the terms of their 
agreements with secondary researchers may bar the latter from 
access to that code. 
Quite noticeably, the proposed changes to the Common 
Rule are at odds with the emerging consensus view that favors 
return of IFs and IRRs from the biobank research system in 
some circumstances. This divergence occurs both at the level of 
principle and at the level of feasibility. While the consensus 
paper identifies both benefits and risks to contributors from 
individual findings,173 the ANPRM states: 
[I]ncreasing use of genetic information, existing (i.e., stored) 
biospecimens, medical records, and administrative claims data in 
research has changed the nature of the risks and benefits of research 
participation. Risks related to these types of research are not physical 
but informational (e.g., resulting from the unauthorized release of 
information about subjects).174 
                                                          
 169. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.111(a) (2012) (requiring IRBs to weigh the risks 
and benefits to study participants); 45 C.F.R. § 46.109(e) (2012) (requiring the 
IRB to continue to review the study over its course). 
 170. See supra notes 22–26 and accompanying text. 
 171. 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(d) (2012); OHRP—Guidance on Research 
Involving Coded Private Information or Biological Specimens, supra note 24. 
 172. BioVu: Vanderbilt’s DNA Databank, VAND. UNIV., 
http://dbmi.mc.vanderbilt.edu/research/dnadatabank.html (last visited Apr. 
19, 2012). 
 173. Wolf et al., supra note 1, at 1, 366–68.  
 174. Human Subjects Research Protections: Enhancing Protections for 
Research Subjects and Reducing Burden, Delay, and Ambiguity for 
Investigators, 76 Fed. Reg. 44,512, 44,513–14 (July 26, 2011) (to be codified at 
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The ANPRM further argues that these informational risks 
are best mitigated through mandatory data security provisions 
that adopt HIPAA’s more stringent definitions for levels of 
identifiablity and that include a prohibition on reidentification 
as a replacement for IRB review.175 
Instead of providing any mechanisms to facilitate the 
return of results where it is otherwise justified, the ANPRM 
treats reidentification as categorically undesirable.176 It 
recommends that standard data protection requirements under 
the Common Rule for secondary research involving deidentified 
data and limited data sets include a prohibition on 
reidentification.177 The proposed changes would also expand 
the categories of research activities excused from IRB review 
altogether based on these prohibitions against 
reidentification.178 In these situations, there might be no IRB to 
consult when contemplating a return of results. Regulators’ 
exclusive focus on informational risks ignores other risks and 
benefits of reidentification, including those that might arise in 
a well-considered return of results. The existing and proposed 
rules recognize the regulatory delays and difficulties that could 
result from reidentification179 and the potential to further 
burden overtaxed IRBs.180 But, the existing and proposed rules 
leave little space for legitimate reidentification in situations 
such as those envisioned by the consensus paper. This 
philosophical divergence leads to practical challenges for the 
biobank research system, which we discuss in the following 
Section. 
B. PRACTICAL CHALLENGES 
To demonstrate the practical challenges of returning 
individual findings from the biobank research system, we offer 
the following narrative descriptions of an extremely ordinary 
chain of events within the biobank research system. We use 
this narrative to illustrate the dilemmas facing primary 
                                                          
45 C.F.R. pts 46, 160, 164, and 21 C.F.R. pts 50, 56). 
 175. Id. at 44,515–16. 
 176. See id. at 44,525 (noting that current privacy protections are not 
strong enough because they did not anticipate how genetic technology would 
“make . . . reidentification . . . easier”). 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. at 44,519. 
 179. See id. at 44,525. 
 180. See id. at 44,518. 
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collection sites and researchers, biobanks, and downstream 
secondary researchers. We first describe the situation as it 
arises under current law and then describe how proposed 
changes to the law under DHHS’ recent ANPRM may affect 
these outcomes. 
First, the hypothetical story: A primary researcher 
obtained IRB approval to conduct a research study on human 
specimens. The IRB evaluated the proposed research with 
respect to all the criteria provided under the Common Rule. 
Because the research study did not present any benefits or 
risks associated with the return of IRRs or IFs, the IRB did not 
require the researcher to include information about such 
returns in her informed consent documents or to present 
procedures for return of results as part of the research design. 
After commencing the study, the primary researcher decided to 
send the specimens to a biobank. The biobank, in turn, sent the 
specimens to a secondary researcher conducting a large-scale 
genetic study. In the course of this research, the secondary 
researcher now discovers an IF of potential clinical significance 
to a contributor. What are the challenges that may arise if 
attempts are made to return this IF back to the contributor in 
question? 
Initially, it is important to recognize that the contributor 
likely has no idea that his specimen has been used for 
secondary research. Furthermore, the contributor likely is not 
aware of any possibility that an IF of clinical significance might 
arise or the possibility that he may be re-contacted with such 
an IF. Keeping this mind, we consider the challenges faced by 
the secondary researcher, biobank, and primary researcher as 
they consider what to do with this IF. 
It is possible that this secondary researcher received the 
information necessary to identify the contributor himself. 
However, if he received the specimens from the biobank in 
identifiable form, he most likely recorded all information in a 
manner that prevents him from identifying the contributor, 
thereby exempting him from Common Rule requirements for 
IRB review and informed consent.181 Even if the secondary 
researcher retained the code for reidentification, there are 
several reasons he almost certainly would not dare to reidentify 
the specimen himself. First, the secondary researcher’s MTA 
                                                          
 181. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.101(b)(4) (2012). 
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with the biobank may well include a prohibition on 
reidentification. Second, an attempt by the secondary 
researcher to reidentify the specimen would trigger regulatory 
obligations for him and his institution under the Common 
Rule.182 In that situation, how can the secondary research 
institution handle the fact that the researcher is now engaging 
in activities that required IRB approval and authorization from 
the contributor or a waiver prior to the research commencing 
the first place? The institution would likely be concerned that 
reidentification would render it materially non-compliant with 
the terms of the Common Rule and jeopardize the project’s 
funding.183 
It is more likely that the secondary researcher is unable to 
reidentify the contributor himself because he obtained the 
specimens in deidentified form from the biobank. In this 
instance, the secondary researcher is not engaged in human 
subjects research at all.184 If he contacts the biobank, is it able 
to provide him with the code to reidentify the specimen? Again, 
the biobank may be barred from doing so under the terms of its 
MTAs with the primary collection site, the secondary 
researcher, or both. Even if all applicable MTAs allow the 
biobank to provide the secondary researcher with the code, 
doing so would change the secondary researcher’s work from 
non-human subjects research to human subjects research and 
raise the regulatory complications described above.185 
Can the secondary researcher ask the biobank to perform 
the reidentification itself? If the biobank has the code to 
reidentify, it may be barred from doing so under its MTA with 
the primary researcher. The biobank may also face a regulatory 
compliance quandary if it decides to reidentify the specimen. If 
the biobank only aggregates and distributes specimens without 
conducting its own research, these activities are not considered 
human subjects research and the biobank never had to comply 
with the Common Rule in the first place.186 Since the biobank is 
not engaged in research, reidentification would not per se 
                                                          
 182. See OHRP—Guidance on Research Involving Coded Private 
Information or Biological Specimens, supra note 24. 
 183. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.123(a) (2011). 
 184. OHRP—Guidance on Research Involving Coded Private Information 
or Biological Specimens, supra note 24. 
 185. See note 191 and accompanying text. 
 186. Guidance on Engagement of Institutions in Human Subjects Research, 
supra note 25. 
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trigger the Common Rule.187 However, the biobank would be 
left with the complicated dilemma of how to contact and return 
results to a contributor who is not even aware that his 
specimen was being used for secondary research. If the biobank 
conducted research in addition to aggregating and distributing 
specimens, then reidentification would create similar 
regulatory complications to those facing the secondary 
researcher.188 Under any of these situations, reidentification 
could also place the biobank, if it is a covered entity under 
HIPAA, at risk of civil and criminal penalties.189 
If neither the secondary researcher nor the biobank can or 
will reidentify the specimen, can the primary collection site do 
so? Certain practical obstacles are most likely for the primary 
collection site, especially if it gathered specimens or data while 
engaged in a particular research project and most especially if 
(as is usually the case) that research did not contemplate any 
grounds for recontact. Grants expire, employees go to other 
institutions or projects, files get archived, and memories 
fade.190 These obstacles may be less likely to occur in a long-
term research project or at a clinically-oriented collection 
site,191 but they are still important considerations. 
Even if these practical obstacles do not arise, legal ones 
may. The primary researcher may, again, be barred from 
performing the reidentification under the terms of her MTA 
                                                          
 187. See notes 48–50 and accompanying text. 
 188. See notes 189–195 and accompanying text. 
 189. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-5 (2006) (establishing civil penalties); § 1320d–6 
(establishing criminal penalties); 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(d)(i)–(ii) (2012) (bringing 
reidentified information back into HIPAA’s scope). 
 190. Wolf et al., supra note 1, at 373 (discussing the difficulty of relocating 
and recontacting a contributor). 
 191. Long-term projects may encounter less difficulty reidentifying 
contributors because they frequently have continuous funding and record-
keeping. See, e.g., Dellara F. Terry et. al, Cardiovascular Risk Factors 
Predictive for Survival and Morbidity-Free Survival in the Oldest-Old 
Framingham Heart Study Participants, 53 J. AM. GERIATRICS SOC. 1944 
(2005) (including Framingham Heart Study participants, aged 85 and older, 
who died since 1948 and noting that only fifty-six of 2,531 participants were 
lost to follow-up). In the case of clinical collection sites, an individual’s records 
are less likely to get lost in the shuffle because state law typically requires 
clinics to retain medical records. E.g., MINN. STAT. § 145.32 subd. 1 (2011) 
(requiring the retention of the “[p]ortions of hospital medical records that 
comprise an individual permanent medical record”). 
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with the biobank.192 Even if no such bar exists, or if the parties 
agree to modify the MTA’s terms, the primary researcher 
probably will not want to perform the reidentification. If the 
primary researcher’s institution is a covered entity under 
HIPAA and the relevant information is PHI, reidentifying the 
specimen would trigger HIPAA requirements for individual 
authorization or waiver from a Privacy Board.193 Any such 
authorization or waiver that the primary researcher obtained 
would have been limited only to the scope of the primary 
research project and would not include provisions for 
reidentification resulting from secondary research on the 
specimen.194 
Furthermore, the primary researcher’s IRB never required 
her to obtain informed consent for secondary research from the 
contributor, nor did it require her to disclose any information 
about return of results in her informed consent agreements. 
Thus, the contributor has no knowledge that his specimen was 
used for secondary research nor did he consent to having the IF 
returned to him. Consequently, the primary researcher has 
significant incentive to refuse to reidentify the specimen. 
If the changes contemplated in the ANPRM come into 
effect, some of these conclusions might change. First, the 
ANPRM would require informed consent for future research, 
which typically could be obtained at the same time as consent 
for the initial research.195 Thus, under the proposed rules, the 
contributor theoretically would be made aware that a 
secondary researcher might get access to his specimens or 
related data (although the contributor still may not be informed 
about any risks associated with IFs arising from that secondary 
research). 
                                                          
 192. See OFFICE OF BIOREPOSITORIES & BIOSPECIMEN RESEARCH, NAT’L 
CANCER INST., NCI BEST PRACTICES FOR BIOSPECIMEN RESOURCES 78 (2011), 
available at http://biospecimens.cancer.gov/bestpractices/2011-
NCIBestPractices.pdf (providing model MTA language that includes requiring 
the recipient of biospecimens to “agree[ ] not to identify or contact any donor . . 
. who may have provided” specimens or data). 
 193. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(d)(2)(i)–(ii). 
 194. See Sec’y’s Advisory Comm. on Human Research Prots., supra note 50, 
at 6–7 (interpreting the Privacy Rule to require study-specific HIPAA 
authorizations). 
 195. Human Subjects Research Protections: Enhancing Protections for 
Research Subjects and Reducing Burden, Delay, and Ambiguity for 
Investigators, 76 Fed. Reg. 44,512, 44,519–20 (July 26, 2011) (to be codified at 
45 C.F.R. pts 46, 160, 164, and 21 C.F.R. pts 50, 56). 
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More significantly, the ANPRM’s new IRB requirements 
strongly encourage secondary researchers who work with 
deidentified data to promise, in advance, that they will make 
no attempt to reidentify.196 If the secondary researcher had any 
plans to potentially re-contact contributors with individual 
findings, he would have had to obtain prior review by an IRB. 
It is likely that many secondary researchers would foreswear 
any such plans to re-contact contributors in order to avoid such 
IRB review and its associated administrative costs and delay to 
research. Consequently, the proposed rules would further and 
more directly disincentivize return of results from secondary 
research. 
Finally, it is important to note that, under the ANPRM, 
biospecimens would be regarded as identifiable under all 
circumstances.197 Thus, we ask: would the outcome be different 
under the proposed rules had the secondary researcher been 
working with pre-existing data rather than pre-existing 
specimens? We find that the outcome would even more 
certainly prevent reidentification as the standardized data 
protections for limited data sets and deidentified information 
under the proposed rules explicitly include a prohibition again 
reidentification. 
V. MANAGEMENT MODELS FOR REIDENTIFICATION 
AND RETURNING INDIVIDUAL FINDINGS 
Entities in every part of the biobank system now must 
confront the regulatory and ethical dilemmas discussed 
above.198 As we have described, existing regulatory structures 
that encourage robust deidentification create tension with a 
growing belief that researchers should return individual 
findings in at least some situations.199 The future direction of 
policy exemplified by the recent ANPRM may increase this 
tension by creating additional barriers to the reidentification 
necessary for return of results.200 
Yet ignoring this conflict will not make it go away. Debate 
                                                          
 196. See id. (proposing a consent requirement at the outset for all future 
research). 
 197. Id. at 44,519. 
 198. See supra Part IV. 
 199. See supra Part IV.A. 
 200. See supra text accompanying notes 165–71. 
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continues about the proper scope of any duty to return results, 
but as long as participants in the biobank system contemplate 
at least some possible return of results—even in a narrow 
subset of cases—then they must plan for that eventuality. This 
imperative unites all viewpoints except for those who believe 
researchers should never return results.201 Whatever decision 
researchers and institutions make about which results to 
return, they must plan in advance how to return those results. 
That second challenge is the focus of Part V. 
We offer two strong recommendations followed by a range 
of three possible management models to implement those 
recommendations. First, it is vital that actors in the biobank 
system make some plan for possible reidentification and 
subsequent return of individual findings. Second, it is 
important that regulators accommodate reidentification for the 
purpose of returning results, in contrast with their current 
posture. As to the management models, the particular details of 
the plan and its regulatory treatment will vary based on many 
individual circumstances, so we offer alternative approaches 
and leave it to individual actors within the biobank research 
system to choose those arrangements most suitable for their 
situation. Regulators ought to maintain a similar agnosticism 
about precise implementation. 
A. ACTORS IN THE BIOBANK SYSTEM MUST PLAN FOR 
REIDENTIFICATION AND RETURN OF RESULTS 
The consensus paper discusses at length the importance of 
advance planning and agreement in managing all the 
complexities of returning individual research findings.202 The 
same is true for reidentification.203 Right now, each biobank 
system is defined primarily by its flow of information from an 
individual who contributes specimens or data through various 
entities including collection sites, biobanks, and secondary 
researchers. This information flow yields scientific knowledge, 
the very purpose for which the entire system exists, so it 
properly remains the primary focus of internal management 
and external regulation of biobank systems. It is not the only 
                                                          
 201. See, e.g., Biobank Frequently Asked Questions, NAT’L PSORIASIS 
FOUND., http://www.psoriasis.org/biobank_faqs (last visited Apr. 19, 2012) 
(“You will not receive any information from your donated samples. You will 
not receive results on the research performed using your samples.”). 
 202. See Wolf et al., supra note 1, at 368–69. 
 203. Id. at 18–19 (offering “Recommendation 6”). 
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important information flow, however. 
Every biobank system also should identify explicitly the 
appropriate “return path” for individual research findings 
through the system in cases where their return is warranted. 
This path points in the opposite direction from the flow that 
dominates discussion about biobank structures, instead leading 
back to the person whose specimen or data became the subject 
of research and gave rise to an individual research finding. 
Somewhere along that return path, some entity within the 
biobank system must reidentify the data or specimen, possibly 
acting in tension with the applicable regulations.204 On balance, 
as elaborated below, biobanks themselves will do the best job of 
taking on the bulk of responsibility to oversee both the 
necessary planning for a return path and the actual 
reidentification of data or specimens. But all actors within the 
biobank system, and perhaps some additional trusted 
intermediaries, will have roles to play. 
The shared understanding about entities’ responsibilities 
for any reidentification and return of results should be 
memorialized explicitly in agreements between the parties, 
presumably as part of the MTAs that already govern those 
relationships.205 Two key variables must be specified in such 
agreements. First, they should spell out the sequence of actions 
from the first realization that an IF or IRR exists through 
recontact. This description of the return path allows each actor 
to understand its role in any return of results. Second, they 
ought to impose an obligation on one of the entities to perform 
the reidentification. The document should clearly indicate 
where consultation with an IRB would be necessary and which 
entity (and which entity’s IRB) would take on any regulatory 
burden associated with reidentification. 
Newly created biobanks will have an easier time 
identifying and maintaining this return path than will 
biobanks already in existence. A new biobank will have the 
freedom to arrange its relationships with collection sites and 
secondary researchers in accordance with its decisions about 
the return path. Older biobanks will have to retrofit existing 
agreements to accommodate a return path as well as they are 
able. This may lead to considerable complexity, especially in 
                                                          
 204. See supra note 164 and accompanying text. 
 205. See supra notes 10–12 and accompanying test. 
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light of the wide variety of collection sites’ informed consent 
procedures regarding biobanking and subsequent deidentified 
research.206 This difference between future and preexisting 
biobanks is just one of the many individual features that 
require flexibility in determining the best return path for each 
biobank structure. The alternative management models 
discussed below present that range of choices. 
Overall, the existence of some explicit agreement 
acceptable to all parties in the biobank system matters more 
than its precise content, for two reasons. First, if actors in the 
biobank system do not plan deliberatively for the return path, 
it may never exist or it may disappear with time. Of course, 
some biobank systems maintain the identifiability of specimens 
and data throughout the research process, notwithstanding the 
increased regulatory burdens that result. They generally make 
this choice for research-related reasons such as a desire to 
study correlations between genetic results and certain 
demographic or lifestyle factors.207 For example, a researcher 
attempting to connect area of residence to health outcomes 
likely needs to know where study participants lived in 
geographic subdivisions smaller than a state.208 Under HIPAA, 
and potentially under the Common Rule, such information is 
identifiable and, consequently, the researcher must comply 
with these regulatory schemes and obtain IRB approval, 
informed consent, and individual authorization or a waiver of 
authorization.209 In these cases, reidentification obviously 
                                                          
 206. See Wolf et al., supra note 1, at 380. 
 207. See Susanne B. Haga & Laura Beskow, Ethical, Legal and Social 
Implications of Biobanks for Genetics Research, 60 ADVANCES GENETICS 505, 
522 (2008); David Wendler, supra note 171, at 1449–50 (“[R]emoval of 
personal identifiers diminishes the scientific value of biological samples, 
making it impossible to conduct some epidemiological research and preventing 
investigators from following up on unexpected findings.”). 
 208. See, e.g., Sam Harper et al., An Overview of Methods for Monitoring 
Social Disparities in Cancer with an Example Using Trends in Lung Cancer 
Incidence by Area-Socioeconomic Position and Race-Ethnicity, 1992–2004, 167 
AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 889, 890–92 (2008) (using banked data from a national 
cancer registry to connect race, ethnicity, and average income in geographical 
unit to incidence of lung cancer). 
 209. Under HIPAA, “geographic subdivisions smaller than a state” must be 
removed in order for information to qualify as deidentified. 45 C.F.R. § 
164.514(b)(2)(i)(B) (2012). Under the Common Rule, such information is 
identifiable if the researcher could readily ascertain the identity of the 
individual. OHRP—Guidance on Research Involving Coded Private 
Information or Biological Specimens, supra note 24, at 3. As discussed above, 
the ANPRM would harmonize these standards and would define such 
003 MCGEVERAN FATEHI MCGARRAUGH_PROOF -SK.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 7/5/2012 1:08 PM 
528 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 13.2 
 
 
presents no obstacle to returning results. At the other extreme, 
a few biobank systems eradicate the return path intentionally, 
based in part on their assessment that risks associated with 
reidentification outweigh any potential benefits.210 
In a significant number of cases, however, biobanks or 
other entities deidentify specimens or data, in satisfaction of 
the regulatory incentives now in place, without sufficiently 
careful protocols for potential reidentification. Often they have 
given little consideration to the possibility. For example, if the 
ANPRM takes effect, conscientious primary collection sites 
would likely routinely strip identifiers in compliance with the 
existing HIPAA definition before ever transferring specimens 
or data to a biobank for use in subsequent downstream 
research. Without any incentive to plan for potential 
reidentification—and often with agreements in place that 
positively forbid reidentification—any notions a secondary 
researcher might entertain of returning individual research 
findings in a particular case could be mooted by the practical 
difficulty of doing so. Alternatively, even where biobanks or 
researchers do anticipate the existence of a return path, it can 
fade with time when no one recognizes the importance of 
maintaining it.211 Files are purged, protocols are misplaced or 
forgotten, key personnel depart, or research projects and even 
whole institutions go out of existence. Planning in advance for 
the continued existence of a return path can help prevent this 
entropy. 
Second, working out the practicalities of reidentification in 
the abstract in advance will permit actors in the biobank 
system to choose best practices across the board, apart from the 
                                                          
information identifiable. See supra Part III.A. 
 210. BioVu: Vanderbilt’s DNA Databank, supra note 180. 
 211. This is a recognized problem in information security. For example, 
programmers frequently write customized computer code in legacy systems, 
intended to solve a particular problem quickly. Over time, those programmers 
leave the institution, or they forget about the patch they wrote, and 
unintended difficulties arise in other contexts. Cf. Edward H. Freeman, Source 
Code Escrow, 13 INFO. SYS. SECURITY 8, 10 (2004) (describing how purchasers 
might protect against software vendors’ instability by placing the program’s 
source code in escrow, only to be released in certain circumstances). This 
problem occurred on a large scale as the year 2000 approached and 
programmers needed to examine old code line by line for instances of dates 
that were presumed to be in the twentieth century. See Five Months and 
Counting, PBS ONLINE NEWSHOUR, July 27, 1999, 
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/cyberspace/july-dec99/y2k_7-27.html. 
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circumstances of an individual case. A decision to return 
results necessarily involves fact-specific inquiry into a 
particular case. Judgments about the best method of recontact 
may turn on such details as the nature of the finding,212 the 
informed consent in force,213 the availability of a clinician who 
has a relationship with the individual,214 and even the 
individual’s age.215 Reidentification and the return path, in 
contrast, are systematic issues that can be resolved once for all 
research within a particular biobank system. These types of 
issues, independent from individualized factual considerations, 
are more amenable to an advance plan that sets up clear rules 
rather than situation-specific standards.216 Furthermore, 
keeping a clear return path open eliminates one of the many 
variables that add so much potential complexity to decisions 
about return of results. Even as conscientious biobanks and 
their partners are struggling in some particular situation to 
determine whether to return results and how to recontact, the 
issue of reidentification can be made simple with an advance 
plan. 
B. THE COMMON RULE AND HIPAA PRIVACY RULE SHOULD 
ADDRESS REIDENTIFICATION FOR RETURN OF RESULTS 
The Common Rule and HIPAA generally impede rather 
than promote the practices we recommend to entities within 
biobank research systems in the previous section. Both regimes 
encourage early and robust deidentification of specimens and 
data used for research purposes. Neither promotes planning to 
reidentify those same specimens or data. If the ANPRM 
informs the future of the Common Rule, deidentification will be 
further enshrined and IRBs will reduce their already minimal 
oversight of the movement of specimens or data through the 
biobank research system. 
Especially as DHHS appears poised to reengineer the 
Common Rule based on the ANPRM, we would recommend two 
types of alterations in the regulatory regime. 
                                                          
 212. See, e.g., Fabsitz et al., supra note 166, at 575 (suggesting criteria for 
determining if a result ought to be returned). 
 213. See, e.g., id. 
 214. See, e.g., Henry S. Richardson, Incidental Findings and Ancillary-Care 
Obligations, 36 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 256, 265 (2008). 
 215. Analysis and Recommendations, supra note 151, at 241–42. 
 216. See Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 
DUKE L.J. 557, 621 (1992). 
003 MCGEVERAN FATEHI MCGARRAUGH_PROOF -SK.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 7/5/2012 1:08 PM 
530 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 13.2 
 
 
First, the Common Rule and related HIPAA-based rules 
could and should specifically stipulate that return of individual 
research findings can be an ethically appropriate reason to 
reidentify specimens or data. At present, neither regime 
contemplates any acceptable non-research reason to engage in 
reidentification.217 The rules could base any authorization for 
reidentification on the sorts of principles identified in the 
consensus paper, such as the clinical actionability of 
findings.218 Because views about return of individual research 
findings remain unsettled and fluid, however, regulators might 
be better off limiting the requirements to ensuring satisfactory 
institutional oversight. For example, the rules could allow 
reidentification for the purpose of returning individual research 
findings contingent on approval of the plan for reidentification 
and recontact by a relevant IRB or Privacy Board (as we 
discuss below, the existence and availability of these oversight 
bodies is one consideration in designing an appropriate the 
return path). Under administrative guidance interpreting the 
Common Rule, an investigator’s reidentification of deidentified 
specimens or data brings the investigator’s research within the 
scope of the Rule.219 No matter what changes DHHS opts to 
make to the Common Rule, administrative guidance or 
regulatory text ought to make clear that reidentification of data 
or specimens, if done for the narrow purpose of returning an IF 
or IRR under the supervision of an IRB, does not trigger the 
application of the Common Rule. 
Our second and related recommendation is that the 
regulatory regime should reinforce our previous points about 
the importance of articulating a plan for the return path. The 
Common Rule could require institutions to have such a plan as 
a condition for the deidentification-based exemptions and 
exceptions discussed above. Plans need not be unique to every 
                                                          
 217. Cf. OHRP—Guidance on Research Involving Coded Private 
Information or Biological Specimens, supra note 24, at 4 (advising that if 
deidentified information is reidentified, the research involves human subjects 
and is within the purview of the Common Rule). 
 218. Wolf et al., supra note 1, at 373. 
 219. OHRP—Guidance on Research Involving Coded Private Information 
or Biological Specimens, supra note 24. The ANPRM anticipates codifying this 
position. See Human Subjects Research Protections: Enhancing Protections for 
Research Subjects and Reducing Burden, Delay, and Ambiguity for 
Investigators, 76 Fed. Reg. 44,526 (July 26, 2011) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. 
pts. 46, 160, 164, and 21 C.F.R. pts. 50, 56). 
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research project because they could be the same for each 
biobank research system. This would create further incentives 
for biobanks, as the central repository in most systems, to have 
established reidentification and recontact plans that could be 
used by downstream researchers for compliance with this 
condition. The management models described below represent 
various possible forms these plans could take. 
C. THREE MANAGEMENT MODELS FOR RETURN OF RESULTS 
WITHIN BIOBANK STRUCTURES 
As biobanks and their partners in collection sites and 
secondary research sites consider ways to design and 
implement a return path for individual findings and results, 
their most important decision will be their respective roles in 
that process.220 In short: who will do what? These assignments 
may come with regulatory burdens, particularly if the Common 
Rule and HIPAA Privacy Rule do not change as we 
recommended in the previous section. In this final section we 
present three management models, each centered on a different 
entity as the primary “keeper of the key” who has the capacity 
to reidentify specimens and data, and we suggest some of the 
advantages and disadvantages of each. We look first at a model 
giving the collection site principal responsibility, then at one 
giving that role to the biobank, and finally at a model relying 
on a third-party intermediary to hold the code. 
We do not consider a model giving the job to the secondary 
researcher, for several reasons. Most obviously, by the time 
specimens or data reach that point, they are highly likely to be 
deidentified already because of all the regulatory incentives to 
do so.221 The secondary researcher comes too late in the process 
to meaningfully safeguard the integrity of a return path. And 
finally, secondary researchers have neither the collection site’s 
proximity to the contributors of specimens or data nor the 
archival role of the biobank. 
1. The Collection Site 
Under one management model, the initial collection site 
                                                          
 220. There are, of course, myriad narrower but very important issues 
which follow that first one, all of them beyond the scope of this Article, 
including the design of informatics, management of data privacy and security 
to prevent unauthorized reidentification, and financial support for these 
functions, to name a few. 
 221. See supra Part IV.A. 
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would deidentify specimens and data before entrusting them to 
a biobank. In the event of a potentially returnable result a 
secondary researcher would notify the biobank, which would in 
turn notify the collection site, which would take responsibility 
for reidentification and presumably recontact. Ideally, the 
collection site would ensure the existence of explicit agreements 
about return of results and the associated return path 
(presumably as part of MTAs or similar contracts) with both 
the biobank and all subsequent secondary researchers, spelling 
out the duties of each. 
This management model imposes regulatory burdens on 
the fewest actors within the biobank research system. Neither 
the biobank nor the secondary researcher would take on 
additional regulation-based duties, because they would only 
handle specimens and data that have been properly 
deidentified. Thus, their activities would not constitute human 
subjects research and the data would not qualify as protected 
health information.222 
The collection site, however, undertakes greater regulatory 
responsibility in this model. First, the regulatory change we 
advocated above in Section B of this Part would require the 
collection site’s IRB (or possibly a separate privacy board if 
applicable) to scrutinize the plan for the return path before any 
transfer of data or specimens to a biobank.223 This review 
would add to the burden on the IRB, which currently has no 
obligation to inquire into the terms of transfers of deidentified 
data to biobanks.224 On the other hand, we would also argue 
that it should be best practice for a collection site to engage in a 
formal examination of such transfers to ensure that they 
incorporate a viable plan for the return path, even if the 
regulations do not require this review. 
Furthermore, if a collection site received a returned 
individual result from a biobank under this model, it probably 
would create additional regulatory complications for the 
collection site. Once reidentified, specimens or data could be 
subject to the Common Rule, even if the collection site had 
never itself conducted any research on them.225 This might 
                                                          
 222. See supra text accompanying notes 23–25. 
 223. See supra Part V.B. 
 224. See supra text accompanying note 53. 
 225. See supra text accompanying notes 18–19. 
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often be the case, for example, when the collection site is a 
clinical facility that merely passed on specimens or data to a 
biobank based on the applicability of the exemption for 
deidentified specimens used for diagnosis or treatment. 
The regulatory change we recommended above would 
require the collection site’s IRB to review such transfers in the 
future to ensure adequate planning for the return path. The 
collection site is the one place where informed consent and IRB 
approval is required, especially under the proposed 
amendments to the Common Rule.226 The initial collection site 
is also the locus of direct interaction between donors and the 
biobank research system.227 As the origin point for the rest of 
the biobank system, collection sites could ensure that material 
transfer agreements contain provisions binding all downstream 
biobanks and secondary researchers to the IRB-approved plan 
for reidentification. This approach may also be best for 
mitigating privacy and data confidentiality concerns, as there 
would be no need for the code to ever be moved. Consequently, 
the risk of unauthorized access would be lowered. 
However, this approach has several potential limitations. 
First, collection sites are often established for the purposes of a 
particular research project and, once that project is complete, 
the collection site no longer has funding or staff and ceases to 
operate. Collection sites with primarily clinical functions may 
lack research-oriented institutional structures such as highly 
developed IRBs. Because many collection sites pass along 
specimens and data to biobanks without receiving significant 
direct benefit in return, imposing extra duties on them may 
discourage their participation in biobank research, eliminating 
potential sources for medical research. Finally, collection sites 
may lack the financial resources, staffing, or expertise to 
manage the code. 
2. The Biobank 
In the second management model, the biobank would take 
on the central role of ensuring a return path and probably of 
performing any necessary reidentification. The biobank could 
receive specimens or data from primary collection sites in 
identifiable form and could itself deidentify them. 
There are several obvious advantages to this approach. 
                                                          
 226. See supra Part III.B. 
 227. See supra text accompanying notes 19–21. 
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Biobanks already perform an intermediary role as archives and 
brokers within the larger system. The functions of managing 
the flow of information through the return path and of 
retaining the codes needed for reidentification would mesh 
better with the primary mission of the biobank than with that 
of many collection sites. In addition, biobanks are less likely 
than collection sites to be short-term institutional actors 
associated with particular projects. By their nature, these 
repositories are designed for a long and stable existence. 
Finally, economies of scale would result because most biobanks 
aggregate data and specimens from a large number of primary 
sources. Each biobank, without reinventing the proverbial 
wheel, could develop a careful advance plan for the return path, 
robust security and other procedures for maintaining 
reidentification data without compromising privacy, and a 
large pool of experience in handling any returns of results that 
might transpire. 
This model might cause difficulty in situations where a 
biobank also conducts its own research (or is housed in an 
institution that conducts research).228 Handling specimens or 
data that remain identifiable could trigger regulatory 
obligations. While these problems would only arise where a 
biobank’s research used the specimens or data at issue, that 
might be the case for a significant proportion of the overall 
pool. Thus, this model might prove most attractive to biobanks 
that serve solely as clearinghouses and do not engage in 
research themselves. 
Conversely, where biobanks do not conduct research or 
handle PHI, they may operate largely outside the purview of 
both the Common Rule and HIPAA.229 In these situations, 
mechanisms for evaluating the plans as we recommend could 
be absent because of this regulatory lacuna. One potential 
regulatory response would be the development of guidance. 
Such guidance could extend to standards that allowed a 
biobank to certify its adherence to specific data security and 
related practices, and perhaps even to a structure as elaborate 
as the Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments 
                                                          
 228. See supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
 229. See Guidance on Engagement of Institutions in Human Subjects 
Research, supra note 25 (advising that merely releasing information or 
specimens to investigators is not, by itself, considered engaging in research 
and so the Common Rule does not apply). 
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(CLIA).230 Preferably, guidance would be simpler, more in 
keeping with the specific HIPAA deidentification rules. By 
establishing a set of best practices to help guide biobanks’ 
activities in maintaining reidentification codes and planning 
for a return path, regulators could protect privacy, allow for 
return of results when warranted, and avoid undue 
interference with biobanks’ important activities. 
Finally, biobanks that perform reidentification and take 
responsibility for planning and maintaining a return path 
would need to work with primary collection sites and secondary 
researchers to ensure that they acted in concert with the 
biobank’s efforts. There may be some educational efforts 
required, for example, to make primary collection sites 
comfortable with transferring identifiable specimens or data to 
the biobank, particularly if they qualified as PHI but even if 
they did not. The biobank probably would need to develop 
standardized language for incorporation into agreements like 
MTAs that would spell out each party’s role and obligations. 
While this could mean more paperwork, we also see it as a 
positive step to ensure advance planning. The consensus paper 
emphasized the importance of such forethought, and we also 
have highlighted the need to plan for the maintenance of a 
return path. 
3. A Trusted Intermediary 
A third possibility is to have collection sites and biobanks 
transfer the code to a trusted third-party intermediary, also 
referred to as a “tissue trustee,”231 or “honest broker.”232 The 
potential role of trusted intermediaries in the proper 
functioning of interlinked health care records has recently 
                                                          
 230. Federal law requires laboratories that test “materials derived from the 
human body for the purposes of providing information for the diagnosis, 
prevention, or treatment of any disease or impairment, or the assessment of 
the health of human beings” to meet certain standards established by the 
Secretary of Health and Human Services. 42 U.S.C.A § 263a(a) (2006). These 
standards are provided in regulation at chapter 42, part 493 of the Code of 
Federal Regulations. 
 231. Rihab Yassin et al. Custodianship as an Ethical Framework for 
Biospecimen-Based Research, 19 CANCER EPIDEMIOLOGY & BIOMARKERS 
PREVENTION 1012, 1013 (2010). 
 232. Id.; Andrew D. Boyd et al., An ‘Honest Broker’ Mechanism to Maintain 
Privacy for Patient Care and Academic Medical Research, 76 INT’L J. MED. 
INFORMATICS 407, 408 (2007). 
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become an issue of considerable discussion.233 Some observers 
argue that an intermediary model is especially well-suited for 
situations where there is the potential for significant growth in 
the volume of data that needs handling, where data is 
especially complex, and where data is sought by multiple users 
for different purposes.234 Meanwhile, scholars in areas beyond 
health care have long contemplated various forms of trusted 
intermediaries as mechanisms for facilitating data transfers, 
filtering and organizing information, and protecting 
information privacy.235 Understandably, discussion of such 
intermediaries focuses on more typical information flows—in 
the case of the biobank research system, the movement of 
information from a collection site to a downstream researcher. 
There is great potential for trusted intermediaries to improve 
privacy and security in those ordinary flows, but our discussion 
focuses on an additional benefit they might provide in 
managing the reverse information flow required for return of 
results. 
Under this model, a secondary researcher who encountered 
an IRR or IF would communicate that finding to the trusted 
intermediary in whom the deidentification key had been 
entrusted. The intermediary would then bear primary 
responsibility for reidentifying the specimen or data and 
arranging subsequent recontact, presumably in concert with 
the collection site. The intermediary might be charged with the 
decision about whether to proceed in returning a particular 
result, but that decision also could be assigned to other actors 
such as the secondary researcher or the biobank while leaving 
                                                          
 233. See, e.g., David Budgen et al., A Data Integration Broker for 
Healthcare Systems, 40 COMPUTER 34, 35 (2007); Barbara J. Evans, Much Ado 
About Data Ownership, 25 HARV. J. LAW & TECH. 69, 100 (2011); Mark A. 
Hall, Property, Privacy, and the Pursuit of Interconnected Electronic Medical 
Records, 95 IOWA L. REV. 631, 661–63 (2010). 
 234. Budgen, supra note 238 (citing D. KRAFZIG, ET AL., ENTERPRISE SOA: 
SERVICE-ORIENTED ARCHITECTURE BEST PRACTICES (2004)). 
 235. See, e.g., Frank Pasquale, Copyright in an Era of Information 
Overload: Toward the Privileging of Categorizers, 60 VAND. L. REV. 135, 187–
88 (2007) (discussing Google Library as an intermediary for copyrighted 
works); Kenneth C. Laudon, Markets and Privacy, 39 COMM. ACM, Sept. 1996, 
at 99–101 (1996) (discussing a possible intermediary for privacy information); 
Kim Cameron, The Laws of Identity, KIM CAMERON’S IDENTITY WEBLOG (Jan. 
8, 2006), http://www.identityblog.com/?p=352 (discussing how a “unifying 
identify metasystem” could be employed to protect Internet privacy and 
safety). 
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the actual management of the reidentification and recontact to 
the intermediary. 
Third-party intermediaries are even more likely to lie 
outside the coverage of the Common Rule and HIPAA than are 
biobanks. Presumably they are not engaged in their own 
research. They rarely would fall within HIPAA’s definition of 
covered entities. As a result, some form of regulatory coverage 
may be desirable for an institution that could play a sensitive 
role both in the traditional activities of a biobank research 
system and in the potential return of results. As noted above in 
reference to biobanks, oversight of trusted intermediaries could 
be provided through a certification program, perhaps modeled 
on CLIA. (Indeed, one set of standards could apply to both 
biobanks and intermediaries, reducing complexity and allowing 
institutions to choose the best management model without 
regard to unjustified regulatory distinctions.) One example of 
such a trusted intermediary model and certification system has 
been implemented and evaluated by the University of 
Pittsburgh. In 2003, the University obtained IRB approval for 
an “honest broker” entity serving as a “firewall” between the 
University’s stored tissue bank and its clinical and research 
functions.236 In 2003, the University obtained IRB approval to 
develop an Honest Broker Facility.237 Prior to commencing any 
brokering activities, personnel from this facility were required 
to obtain an honest broker certification by completing an IRB-
mandated educational program on research integrity, human 
subjects research protections, and HIPAA requirements.238 The 
Honest Broker Facility also provides biannual updates to the 
IRB as part of on-going auditing and monitoring.239 Certified 
honest brokers from the Honest Broker Facility are the only 
individuals with access to information linking stored tissues 
with donors’ identifying information.240 New information about 
donors from upstream clinical sources and research findings 
from downstream researchers both flow to the honest broker, 
allowing the broker to maintain an accurate database of 
current information and a means to reidentify donors in the 
                                                          
 236. Rajiv Dhir et al., A Multidisciplinary Approach to Honest Broker 
Services for Tissue Banks and Clinical Data: A Pragmatic and Practical 
Model, 113 CANCER 1705, 1711 (2008). 
 237. Id. at 1711–12. 
 238. Id. at 1709. 
 239. Id. 
 240. Id. at 1708–09. 
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event of an IRB-approved returnable result.241 
A variation on the trusted intermediary is the “charitable 
trust” model. This model is similar to the trusted intermediary 
model in that a third-party charitable trust assumes the 
responsibility for holding codes for reidentifying contributors. 
The charitable trust model goes one step further, however, by 
establishing a fiduciary duty to donors to use specimens only as 
approved by donors.242 Under this model, donors must provide 
informed consent to future research on specimens or data 
collected for primary research or non-research purposes.243 The 
trust is responsible for encrypting identifying information 
before sharing specimens or data with secondary researchers 
and biobanks and for maintaining the encryption key.244 If 
contributors requested during the informed consent process 
that they receive information about the research findings 
facilitated by their participation, the trust is also responsible 
for communicating that information from secondary 
researchers back to donors.245 The trust is governed by a board 
of trustees composed of members from the trust’s IRB and 
donor advocacy groups.246 Needless to say, because such a 
model already anticipates an information flow from secondary 
researchers back to donors, it would be especially easy for it to 
accommodate a return path for individual findings where 
warranted. 
These various intermediary models have several 
advantages in common. First, they can serve the role of broker 
and steward. Second, they can be designed with structures such 
as boards of trustees that enable donor groups to have a direct 
voice in governance. Third, they have the benefit of longevity 
where collection sites and even biobanks may be forced to shut 
down due to lack of funding or completion of purpose. Finally, 
and perhaps most significantly for the purposes of this article, 
trusted intermediaries generally stand outside the existing 
complex tangle of regulatory requirements we have described. 
                                                          
 241. See id. 
 242. David E. Winickoff & Richard N. Winickoff, The Charitable Trust as a 
Model for Genomic Biobanks, 349 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1180, 1182 (2003). 
 243. Id. at 1182–83. 
 244. Id. at 1182. 
 245. See id. at 1183 (proposing that the charitable trust could recontact 
donors to gather more information if needed). 
 246. Id. at 1182–83. 
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This model allows for a clean slate and minimizes the awkward 
process of fitting new practices such as return of results into 
existing regulation designed for different purposes. 
The principal disadvantage we see is the addition of 
another actor to the already complicated structure of biobank 
research systems. In some relatively simple arrangements, the 
addition of another player would not be worthwhile. As large-
scale collection and transfer of pecimens and data increase, 
however, we expect to see greater reliance on various types of 
intermediaries, driven in part by considerations completely 
separate from our concerns about return of results, legitimate 
reidentification, and a return path. In those situations, we hope 
they will be designed to accommodate return of results as well. 
CONCLUSION 
As biobank research systems contemplate the possibility of 
returning individual research results and incidental findings to 
contributors of specimens and data, they face a host of 
regulatory complexities. Many of these arise from the difficult 
ethical issues connected to the initial decision to return such 
results. This article has emphasized regulatory obstacles that 
occur later, but may render meaningless any previous decision 
to return results. Without a legally sound basis for 
reidentifying specimens and data, and an agreed-upon 
distribution of responsibilities for the return path of 
information back to the original contributor, it will never be 
delivered. 
The current regulatory regimes of the Common Rule and 
HIPAA create strong incentives for deidentification of 
specimens and data. They do not contemplate any legitimate 
reasons for reidentification. Moreover, the regulators have 
signaled, in a recent ANPRM, a desire to increase their 
emphasis on deidentification even further in future regulatory 
amendments. We have demonstrated the poor fit between these 
regulatory structures and the growing view that return of 
results should be considered in at least some circumstances. We 
also have suggested some regulatory changes that would better 
accommodate that view and some management models for 
biobank research systems interested in preparing for the 
possible return of results. Clearly, there needs to be more 
deliberation about these complex issues, but we hope the 
consensus paper, this symposium, and this article help to start 
the conversation. 
